Income Heterogeneity in the Voluntary Provision of Dynamic Public Goods

Seçilmiş, Erdem; Güran, Mehmet Cahit

doi:10.1111/1468-0106.12006

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Consequently, with punishment, low-benefit members did not benefit from being part of a privileged group. Secilmis & Gü ran [115] studied the effects of differences in endowment. They observed higher average contributions in egalitarian groups.…”

Section: (Iv) Experimental Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

113

133

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One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences: evidence from primates and humans'. I review the theoretical and experimental literature on the collective action problem in groups whose members differ in various characteristics affecting individual costs, benefits and preferences in collective actions. I focus on evolutionary models that predict how individual efforts and fitnesses, group efforts and the amount of produced collective goods depend on the group's size and heterogeneity, as well as on the benefit and cost functions and parameters. I consider collective actions that aim to overcome the challenges from nature or win competition with neighbouring groups of co-specifics. I show that the largest contributors towards production of collective goods will typically be group members with the highest stake in it or for whom the effort is least costly, or those who have the largest capability or initial endowment. Under some conditions, such group members end up with smaller net pay-offs than the rest of the group. That is, they effectively behave as altruists. With weak nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, the group effort typically decreases with group size and increases with within-group heterogeneity. With strong nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, these patterns are reversed. I discuss the implications of theoretical results for animal behaviour, human origins and psychology.

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Section: (Iv) Experimental Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

113

133

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“…Other public goods experiment-based studies suggest that economic heterogeneity is likely to have a deleterious impact on collective action (Anderson et al, 2008;Fung & Au, 2014;Seçilmiş & Güran, 2012), especially when individuals are aware of differences in wealth levels (Anderson et al, 2008). Given subjects having full information and the absence of corrective institutions, we, thus, hypothesize that wealth heterogeneity undermines collective action: Rapoport & Suleiman, 1993;Visser & Burns, 2015).…”

Section: Theimpactofwealthheterogeneityoncbcmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…In linear public goods games, however, Chan et al (1996, 1999) and Hofmyer et al (2007) find little effect on group cooperation as wealth heterogeneity increases. Other public goods experiment‐based studies suggest that economic heterogeneity is likely to have a deleterious impact on collective action (Anderson et al, 2008; Fung & Au, 2014; Seçilmiş & Güran, 2012), especially when individuals are aware of differences in wealth levels (Anderson et al, 2008). Given subjects having full information and the absence of corrective institutions, we, thus, hypothesize that wealth heterogeneity undermines collective action:H1 Wealth heterogeneity hypothesis: Under conditions of full information, the presence of endowment heterogeneity will decrease groups' overall rate of contribution to collective action.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wealth and risk heterogeneity effects in community‐based wildlife management: Experimental evidence

Carpenter

Kreitmair

2023

People and Nature

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1. Community-based conservation is a widely adopted wildlife governance approach, but questions remain about the conditions under which this form of wildlife governance achieves success. Particularly, participating communities are often marked by considerable wealth and risk heterogeneities that are driven by differences in livestock or agricultural holdings and varying exposure to wildlife depredation of those holdings.2. The effect of these types of heterogeneity on successful conservation collective action is understudied, particularly in the case of risk heterogeneity. This lacuna limits policymakers' ability to effectively match the design of community-based programs to their particular settings.3. Using established behavioural experimental techniques, we model the incentive structures underlying community-based wildlife conservation where actors differ in wealth and exposure to human-wildlife conflict. We conduct a modified binary linear voluntary contribution mechanism game, in which we vary subject endowments and risk of incurring a loss when participating in collective action and we find that the type of heterogeneity matters to collective action success. 4. On their own, the presence of either economic or risk heterogeneities (but not both) dampen cooperation compared with homogeneous groups, as do 'balanced' distributions of both heterogeneities (where individuals facing high risk levels receive high endowments and vice versa). However, groups with 'unbalanced' heterogeneities (where those facing high risk levels receive low endowments and vice versa) demonstrate cooperation at similar levels to that of homogeneous groups.5. At the individual level, risk drives cooperative behaviour, although its impact is influenced by relative wealth levels when both forms of heterogeneity are present.6. These findings suggest the need for a more in-depth look at the role and interaction of risk and wealth heterogeneities in conservation management.

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“…However, most of the existing literature has ignored features that are present in many development settings such as high degrees of inequality and subsistence poverty limiting the ability of some people in the group to contribute to the public good. Absent lottery incentives, past studies have found that an increase in inequality is often associated with reduced cooperation and provision of public goods (e.g., Cardenas, 2003; Cherry et al, 2005; Fung & Au, 2014; Gächter et al, 2017; Hargreaves Heap et al, 2016; Keser et al, 2014; Nitta, 2014; Rapoport, 1993; Seçilmiş & Güran, 2012). Should the negative effects of inequality extend to lottery funding mechanisms as well, then the practical promise of such procedures may be minimal.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Whether the success of lotteries in encouraging contributions to public goods in the laboratory can be translated into an effective tool in assisting developing communities depends, at least in part, on how factors such as inequality and subsistence poverty interact with the performance of such lottery schemes. Past research on inequality has generally found it to have a negative impact on investments with standard voluntary contributions mechanisms (e.g., Balafoutas et al, 2013;Cadigan et al, 2011;Cherry et al, 2005;Fung & Au, 2014;Hargreaves Heap et al, 2016;Keser et al, 2014;Nitta, 2014;Rapoport, 1993;Seçilmiş & Güran, 2012;and Gächter et al, 2017) although some have found inequality to have no effect (e.g., Bergstrom et al, 1986;Buckley & Croson,2006;Chan et al, 1996Chan et al, , 1999Hofmeyr et al, 2007). 4 Given that inequality can be quite stark in many developing communities, if inequality has a negative effect for lottery funding mechanism it would cast doubt on the ability of such schemes to work in development contexts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%