2007
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1060.0241
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Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation

Abstract: D espite the many undesirable outcomes of corporate misconduct, scholars have an inadequate understanding of corporate misconduct's causes and mechanisms. We extend the behavioral theory of the firm, which traditionally assumes away the possibility of firm impropriety, to develop hypotheses predicting that top management incentive compensation and poor organizational performance relative to aspirations increase the likelihood of financial misrepresentation. Using a sample of financial restatements prompted by … Show more

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Cited by 601 publications
(560 citation statements)
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References 94 publications
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“…We believe that our contributions also lend further support to the nascent but growing body of research indicating that equity-based compensation may not motivate CEOs to act in the best interests of shareholders (e.g., Harris & Bromiley, 2007;Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 55%
“…We believe that our contributions also lend further support to the nascent but growing body of research indicating that equity-based compensation may not motivate CEOs to act in the best interests of shareholders (e.g., Harris & Bromiley, 2007;Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 55%
“…Like earlier studies, most recent work in this area treats compensation contracts as exogenous and looks for a positive relationship between executives' equity incentives and earnings management (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007;Cheng and Warfield, 2005), the frequency of accounting restatements (Harris and Bromiley, 2007;Burns and Kedia, 2006;Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007;Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker, 2010a), or SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006;Johnson, Ryan, and, Tian, 2009). Most studies adopt a "rent extraction" perspective and interpret a positive relationship between equity incentives and accounting manipulation as a symptom of "bad" governance and misaligned managerial incentives.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some statistical methods could, at least partly, help to overcome the limitations regarding data. Techniques such as combined pairings (see Collins & Hansen, 2012;Harris & Bromiley, 2007) could be used, comparing companies with different performances, providing an alternative for building a small database and important insights for research. Matched-pairs approach have already been used by Collins and Hansen (2012), Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) and Harris and Bromiley (2007).…”
Section: Challenges To Overcome When Conducting Research On Decline Amentioning
confidence: 99%