Incentives in Security Protocols

Azouvi, Sarah; Hicks, Alexander; Murdoch, Steven J.

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03251-7_15

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Professional organizations, services providers, and regulatory authorities must collaborate to form a comprehensive and standardized DLT security approach. Azouvi et al [97] emphasize that incentive systems play an essential role for the security guard in order to enhance system security. DLT could also provide traceability to the access of information.…”

Section: Evaluation Framework For a Dlt-based Eu Etsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A European Emissions Trading System Powered by Distributed Ledger Technology: An Evaluation Framework

Mandaroux

Dong

Li³

2021

Sustainability

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The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a major pillar of the European energy policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, the reportedly pervasive frauds in this market are constraining the beneficial role of the EU ETS. In this conceptual paper, we propose to digitalize the EU ETS by distributed ledger technology (DLT), enabling the verification of authenticity and provenance, proof of ownership, and lifecycle traceability of carbon certificates and assets. Our platform allows verifiable credentials to validate emission allowances, real-time tracking of trading participants’ emissions, and the audit trail reporting of the decentralized trading records. Furthermore, we complement the DLT application concept with a structured interdisciplinary evaluation framework. Our framework and analysis aim to stimulate further interdisciplinary research in this area to support regulators, such as the European Commission, in designing effective digital emissions trading systems.

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Section: Evaluation Framework For a Dlt-based Eu Etsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A European Emissions Trading System Powered by Distributed Ledger Technology: An Evaluation Framework

Mandaroux

Dong

Li³

2021

Sustainability

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“…The application of Nash equilibrium as a stability concept in blockchains is not uncontroversial [11], [94]. In particular, [94] and [56] argue that the shortcomings of Nash equilibria in distributed computational systems involve the following dimensions: unexpected behavior (irrational players with outof-system incentives), coalitional deviations, computational limitations (resource-bounded players) and too much uncertainty or a lack of information (players are unaware of all the aspects of the game).…”

Section: A Alternative Equilibrium Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite its theoretical appeal, [94] observes that the concept of (k, t)-robust equlibrium has its own limitations and points to concepts of computational equilibria and particularly to the BAR-model -model with Byzantine, Altruistic and Rational agents -as possible alternatives [3], [11]. Nevertheless, [92] provide strong arguments to support the use of Nash equilibrium by showing that large games are inately fault tolerant.…”

Section: A Alternative Equilibrium Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

PREStO: A Systematic Framework for Blockchain Consensus Protocols

Leonardos

Reijsbergen

Piliouras

2020

IEEE Trans. Eng. Manage.

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The rapid evolution of the blockchain community has brought together stakeholders from fundamentally different backgrounds: cryptographers, protocol designers, software developers, startup entrepreneurs, corporate executives and investors, academics of various disciplines, and end users. The result is a diverse ecosystem, presently exemplified by the development of a wide range of different blockchain protocols. This raises questions for policy and decision makers: How do different protocols compare? What are their trade-offs? Existing efforts to survey the area reveal a fragmented terminology, and the lack of a unified framework to make the different desirable properties of blockchain protocols explicit.In this paper, we work towards bridging this gap. We evaluate protocols within a five-dimensional design space with the following axes. Optimality: does the protocol achieve its main goals? Stability: are the incentives of its participating agents well-aligned? Efficiency: is its output maximal relative to its use of resources? Robustness: can it cope when its operational assumptions are invalid or perturbed? Persistence: can it recover from catastrophic events? Based on the relevant literature, we organize the properties of existing protocols in subcategories of increasing granularity. The result is a dynamic scheme -termed the PREStO framework. Its scope is to aid the communication between stakeholders of different backgrounds, including managers and investors, and to identify research challenges and opportunities for blockchain protocols in a systematic way. We illustrate this via use cases and make a first step to understand the blockchain ecosystem through a more comprehensive lens.

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“…A recent revision of S&S principles in 2012 by Smith [9, p. 24] casted this authentic interpretation by renaming the 'Fail-safe default' principle as 'Deny by default' . This notion of fail-safe has been used from classical security protocols [2] to modern incentives for distributed computations [7]. It is also well understood in access control [8] and software design [4].…”

Section: Fail-safe For Information Usementioning

confidence: 99%