Incentive Compatible Queues Without Money

Abstract

For job scheduling systems, where jobs require some amount of processing and then leave the system, it is natural for each user to provide an estimate of their job's time requirement in order to aid the scheduler. However, if there is no incentive mechanism for truthfulness, each user will be motivated to provide estimates that give their job precedence in the schedule, so that the job completes as early as possible.We examine how to make such scheduling systems incentive compatible, without using monetary charges, under a natural queueing theory framework. In our setup, each user has an estimate of their job's running time, but it is possible for this estimate to be incorrect. We examine scheduling policies where if a job exceeds its estimate, it is with some probability "punished" and re-scheduled after other jobs, to disincentivize underestimates of job times. However, because user estimates may be incorrect (without any malicious intent), excessive punishment may incentivize users to overestimate their job times, which leads to less efficient scheduling. We describe two natural scheduling policies, BlindTrust and MeasuredTrust. We show that, for both of these policies, given the parameters of the system, we can efficiently determine the set of punishment probabilities that are incentive compatible, in that users are incentivized to provide their actual estimate of the job time. Moreover, we prove for MeasuredTrust that in the limit as estimates converge to perfect accuracy, the range of punishment probabilities that are incentive compatible converges to [0, 1]. Our formalism establishes a framework for studying further queue-based scheduling problems where job time estimates from users are utilized, and the system needs to incentivize truthful reporting of estimates.1 An M/G/1 queue has Poisson (memoryless) arrivals (denoted by the M), general i.i.d. service times governed by a common distribution (denoted by the G), and a single server (denoted by the 1).