Incentive-based control of ad hoc networks: A performance study

Göbel, Johannes; Krzesinski, A. E.; Mandjes, Michel

doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2009.04.010

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…Routing security problems in MANETs have hindered the development and deployment of these networks (Marti et al, 2000;Sonja and Boudec, 2002;Lee et al, 2009;Martignon et al, 2009;Gobel et al, 2009;Catanuto et al, 2009;Yu and Leung, 2009;Agrawal and Patwari 2009;Kang et al, 2010). A MANET has several special properties: network topologies and memberships are constantly changing, and no predefined trust exists between communication partners; limited bandwidth, battery lifetime, and computation power prohibit the deployment of complex encryption algorithms and the establishment of public key infrastructure (PKI).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building a trusted route in a mobile ad hoc network considering communication reliability and path length

Wang

Liu

Jiao

2011

Journal of Network and Computer Applications

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building a trusted route in a mobile ad hoc network considering communication reliability and path length

Wang

Liu

Jiao

2011

Journal of Network and Computer Applications

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“…The nodes use credits to pay for the costs of sending their own traffic, and earn credits by forwarding traffic from other nodes. The incentive scheme is decentralized: no central controller is needed, and the scheme therefore has favourable scalability properties [5]. An incentive mechanism similar to [4] was previously presented in Buttyán and Hubaux [1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks

Krzesinski¹

2014

2014 Australasian Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ATNAC)

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Consider a mobile ad hoc network where the nodes belong to different authorities. The nodes must be given incentives to spend their resources (battery power and transmission bandwidth) in forwarding packets that originate at nodes belonging to another authority. This can be done by assigning a credit balance to each node: when a node acts as an originating node it uses its credits to pay for the costs of sending its own traffic; when a node acts as a transit node it earns credits by forwarding traffic from other nodes. This paper presents a credit-based incentive scheme which assists nodes when they lack the credits necessary to transmit their data. An essential part of the credit-based scheme is a decentralised credit redistribution mechanism to destroy (create) credit at nodes that are over (under) supplied with credit.The goal of this paper is to investigate the effect of various fraudulent activities on the performance of the credit-based incentive scheme. We show that the credit-based scheme is inherently robust with respect to a number of fraudulent activities, provided the nodes behave in a rational manner. We show that credit redistribution is the main reason why the credit-based incentive scheme is relatively immune to fraud.

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Game-based modeling of node cooperation in Ad Hoc networks

Wang

Ding

et al. 2010

The 19th Annual Wireless and Optical Communications Conference (WOCC 2010)

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Incentive-based control of ad hoc networks: A performance study

Cited by 5 publications

References 16 publications

Building a trusted route in a mobile ad hoc network considering communication reliability and path length

Building a trusted route in a mobile ad hoc network considering communication reliability and path length

Robust cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks

Game-based modeling of node cooperation in Ad Hoc networks

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