In Trust We Trust: Epistemic Vigilance and Responsibility

Levy, Neil

doi:10.1080/02691728.2022.2042420

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…One might agree with the general thrust of my conceptual analysis in the article but insist that other virtues are more essential than OM for responsibly navigating online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. For instance, one might aver, contra Battaly (2021), that the virtue of epistemic vigilance (Levy 2022;Sperber et al 2010) will be more effective for the knowledgepossessing digital user than closed-mindedness at maximizing overall epistemic effects (or at least minimizing overall epistemic harm) in the context of epistemically hostile online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Or one might argue, contra Nguyen (2020), that the virtue of epistemic charity (Berhow 2022) will be more beneficial than an excess of OM for epistemically corrupted digital users needing to escape epistemically hostile online echo chambers.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Online Echo Chambers, Online Epistemic Bubbles, and Open-Mindedness

Turner

2023

Episteme

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This article is an exercise in the virtue epistemology of the internet, an area of applied virtue epistemology that investigates how online environments impact the development of intellectual virtues, and how intellectual virtues manifest within online environments. I examine online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles (Nguyen 2020, Episteme17(2), 141–61), exploring the conceptual relationship between these online environments and the virtue of open-mindedness (Battaly 2018b, Episteme15(3), 261–82). The article answers two key individual-level, virtue epistemic questions: (Q1) How does immersion in online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles affect the cultivation and preservation of open-mindedness, and (Q2) Is it always intellectually virtuous to exhibit open-mindedness in the context of online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles? In response to Q1, I contend that both online echo chambers and online epistemic bubbles threaten to undermine the cultivation and preservation of open-mindedness, albeit via different mechanisms and to different degrees. In response to Q2, I affirm that both a deficiency and excess of open-mindedness can be virtuous in these online environments, depending on the epistemic orientation of the digital user.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Online Echo Chambers, Online Epistemic Bubbles, and Open-Mindedness

Turner

2023

Episteme

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“…I also owe Stephen Hetherington thanks for encouragement. Section 3 contains material originally published in Levy (2022). I gratefully acknowledge the support of the John Templeton Foundation (grant 62631) and of the Wellcome Trust (grant WT104848).…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy, Bullshit, and Peer Review

Levy

2023

Self Cite

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Peer review is supposed to ensure that published work, in philosophy and in other disciplines, meets high standards of rigor and interest. But many people fear that it no longer is fit to play this role. This Element examines some of their concerns. It uses evidence that critics of peer review sometimes cite to show its failures, as well as empirical literature on the reception of bullshit, to advance positive claims about how the assessment of scholarly work is appropriately influenced by features of the context in which it appears: for example, by readers' knowledge of authorship or of publication venue. Reader attitude makes an appropriate and sometimes decisive difference to perceptions of argument quality. This Element finishes by considering the difference that author attitudes to their own arguments can appropriately make to their reception. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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“…Perhaps this is not entirely unfortunate. Buckwalter suggests that in certain cases, an author's lived experience is relevant to the assessment of her argument, and that this is yet further reason to require a BNPsince it would require "extensive academic 3 For extended discussion, see Levy (2022;Forthcoming). 4 The canonical example here is Lackey's (1999: 477) 'Creationist Teacher,' who teaches her class about evolution despite not believing it herself.…”

Section: Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Publishing, Belief, and Self-Trust

Plakias

2022

Episteme

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This paper offers a defense of ‘publishing without belief’ (PWB) – the view that authors are not required to believe what they publish. I address objections to the view ranging from outright denial and advocacy of a belief norm for publication, to a modified version that allows for some cases of PWB but not others. I reject these modifications. In doing so, I offer both an alternative story about the motivations for PWB and a diagnosis of the disagreement over its permissibility. The original defense focused on consequentialist reasons for allowing PWB, offering mostly defensive arguments against potential criticisms. But I argue that once we shift our focus to the reasons why authors might be prone to PWB, we see a difference in two types of motivation: whereas I imagine PWB as arising from underconfident agents, critics point to cagey or nefarious authorial practices, or authors’ failure to clarify their own degrees of belief. Underlying the debate over norms of philosophical publishing, we find two different conceptions of philosophy itself.

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In Trust We Trust: Epistemic Vigilance and Responsibility

Cited by 9 publications

References 43 publications

Online Echo Chambers, Online Epistemic Bubbles, and Open-Mindedness

Online Echo Chambers, Online Epistemic Bubbles, and Open-Mindedness

Philosophy, Bullshit, and Peer Review

Publishing, Belief, and Self-Trust

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