In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century

Strangio, Sebastian; Cook, Malcolm

doi:10.1355/cs42-3g

Cited by 15 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…During his first two years in office, Jokowi met Chinese President Xi Jinping whom he saw as a fellow “results‐oriented” leader five times and joined China‐initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Strangio, 2020, p. 236). The joint statement issued during Jokowi's first official visit to Beijing in March 2015 includes a phrase that both sides agreed that “the initiative of the 21st‐Century Maritime Silk Road proposed by President Xi Jinping and the strategy of the Global Maritime Fulcrum initiated by President Joko Widodo are highly complementary to each other”, aiming to “advance maritime infrastructure connectivity.” China's support for infrastructure development under the BRI was expected to assist the Jokowi administration to attain the national goal of becoming a maritime great power through the GMF.…”

Section: Indonesia's Cautious Engagement In the Brimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indonesia's policy response to new regional initiatives with geostrategic nature such as the BRI and the Indo-Pacific is the main focus of this study. A growing number of studies have examined Indonesia's engagement in the BRI, aiming to enunciate the development of and concerns about BRI projects and connections to its national development vision (Damuri et al, 2019;Mursitama & Ying, 2021;Negara et al, 2018Negara et al, , 2021Strangio, 2020). Other studies have examined Indonesia's strategic reactions to Indo-Pacific politics by exploring its role conception and strategic intentions, the country's regional position in the Indo-Pacific, and tangible policy developments (Agastia, 2020;Anwar, 2020;Febrica, 2021;Mubah, 2019;Scott, 2019;Wicaksana, 2021).…”

Section: Hedging As a State's Strategic Responsementioning

confidence: 99%

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Indonesia's response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo‐Pacific: A pivotal state's hedging strategy

Yoshimatsu

2022

Asian Politics and Policy

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Regional politics surrounding Southeast Asia has exhibited significant developments with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and counter initiatives through the Indo-Pacific concept. This article seeks to examine Indonesia's strategic reactions to such regional developments. It argues that Indonesia has exhibited policy responses to the BRI and the Indo-Pacific concept by hedging against uncertainties created by China's economic prowess through the adoption of mutually contradictory policy options. Such a hedging strategy was present in various dimensions: adopting economic accommodation and economic diversification regarding the BRI; taking confrontational strategies in maritime security tensions with China while pursuing economic pragmatism for attracting BRI funds; and restraining reliance on China and its BRI by pushing forwards Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) regional initiative that uses the Indo-Pacific term. The findings indicate that Indonesia's position is crucial for bolstering ASEAN's status as the main regional organization under evolving regional politics.

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Section: Indonesia's Cautious Engagement In the Brimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hedging As a State's Strategic Responsementioning

confidence: 99%

Indonesia's response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo‐Pacific: A pivotal state's hedging strategy

Yoshimatsu

2022

Asian Politics and Policy

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“…This strategy, later defined as the 'Rebalance to Asia', aimed to increase US military, economic and political influence in the region while weakening the influence, and contain the rise, of China (Jianren, 2019;Takahashi, 2021). The motivation for this rebalance was primarily taken to be China's increasing weight in the Asia-Pacific region, its assertiveness relating to its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas from 2009 onwards, and its alleged reluctance to abide by the norms and values of the liberal international order (Friedberg, 2015;Shifrinson, 2018b;Strangio, 2020).…”

Section: China-usa Relations In the 2010s And 2020smentioning

confidence: 99%

Preventive or Revisionist Challenge During Power Transition? The Case of China–USA Strategic Competition

Can

Chan

2022

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs

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Some scholars argue that established great powers tend to launch preventive wars to halt and reverse power transition processes, while others argue that it is the rising great powers that initiate revisionist challenges. Through the application of the preventive war model and the theory of strategic competition, this article argues that we should identify the initiation of a hegemonic war in the agency of established great powers during power transition processes and that hegemonic confrontations, in the age of nuclear weapons, are limited to the diplomatic domain where great powers will compete for relative strategic influence in the world. The argument is then applied for a re-examination of China–USA relations as this provides a novel ground for testing its explanatory power. Based on our findings, the article further argues that the USA has been the instigator of a preventive strategic competition against China aimed to halt and reverse the ongoing power transition process.

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“…Even though most RCEP partners outside China are greatly concerned about China's recent political and security moves, particularly in Southeast Asia (Emmerson, 2020;Strangio, 2020;Hiebert, 2020b), it is hard to exaggerate the signal sent by the conclusion of the RCEP in the midst of the COVID-19 catastrophe. It symbolizes a degree of convergence and understanding within Asia about response to COVID-19, support for globalization, and belief in multilateralism, whatever the security and political tensions.…”

Section: Punching Above Its Weight: East Asian Performance Across Regime Typesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The East Asian Covid-19 Paradox

Tiberghien

2021

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The COVID-19 pandemic triggered the first global public health emergency since 1918, the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression, and the greatest geopolitical tensions in decades. Global governance mechanisms failed. Yet in 2020, East Asian countries (with caveats) managed to control COVID-19 better than most other countries and to increase their cooperation toward economic integration, despite their position on the security front line. What explains this East Asian COVID paradox in a region devoid of strong regional institutions? This Element argues that high levels of institutional preparation, social cohesion, and global strategic reinforcement in a context of situational convergence explain the results. It relies on high-level interviews and case studies across the region.

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In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Indonesia's response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo‐Pacific: A pivotal state's hedging strategy

Indonesia's response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo‐Pacific: A pivotal state's hedging strategy

Preventive or Revisionist Challenge During Power Transition? The Case of China–USA Strategic Competition

The East Asian Covid-19 Paradox

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