IN PRAISE OF INTOLERANCE TO CHARLATANISM IN ACADEMIA ^a

An Essay for Educators: Epistemological Realism Really is Common Sense

“…Their conception of science was not like the inductivist-realist philosophy of science. That received view was ''characterized by an urgent desire for 'objectivity', empiricism and elimination of metaphysics'' (Elkana 2000, p. 463) and, the tradition in science teaching was to feed the student with huge amounts of information about 'objective' facts, and 'proved' laws of nature, and after the law had been memorized, the teacher performed a demonstration in class... [that] served as an experimental confirmation... (Elkana 2000, p. 465) Bruner, Schwab, and Zacharias, in contrast, saw science textbooks as little more than collections of facts and ideas (Bruner 1960). They were concerned about the structure of science textbooks and science curriculum, and observed that they did not reflect the structures of scientific disciplines at a time when increasing importance was being attributed to those structures.…”

“…Reminiscent of Duschl's 1985title, DeBoer (1991 claimed that in the twenty years preceding the NSF reform efforts, ''science teaching had not kept pace'' with new conceptions of science as described by Jerome Bruner (1960), Joseph Schwab (1962) and Jerrod Zacharias (1959). Their conception of science was not like the inductivist-realist philosophy of science.…”

The role of nonequilibrium thermo-mechanical statistics in modern technologies and industrial processes: an overview

“…Moreover, Rolf Landauer [227] has argued that "advocacy of MaxEnt is perpertuated by selective decision making in the generation of papers [...] MaxEnt is likely to be sound, but often it is dreadfully difficult to understand what the constraints are". Mario Bunge stated [228] that "when confronted with a random or seemingly random process, one attempts to build a probabilistic model that could be tested against empirical data; no randomness, no probability. Moreover, as Poincaré pointed out long ago, talk of probability involves some knowledge; it is not a substitute for ignorance (and Bunge adds, not correctly in what refers to the statistical mechanics we are discussing here, that) this is not how the Bayesian or personalists view the matter: when confronted with ignorance or uncertainty, they use probability -or rather their own version of it.…”

Evolutionary program in sociology

“…Collins 1989;Bunge 1993Bunge , 1996. Слична је ситуација и са филозофијом, која у својој историји садржи бројне погрешне моделе људског ума, управо зато што током већег дела свог посто-јања није поседовала концепт еволуције путем природне селекције, без које људски ум и његово функционисање није могуће објаснити (види нпр.…”