In Praise of Difficult People: A Portrait of the Committed Whistleblower

Jos, Philip H.; Tompkins, Mark E.; Hays, Steven W.

doi:10.2307/976577

Cited by 161 publications

(119 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Empirical research in this tradition, mostly quantitative, has led to the conclusion that a number of individual, situational and organisational factors can have an impact on whistleblowing intentions or behaviour (see e.g. King & Hermodson, 2000;Near & Miceli, 1996;Jos et al, 1989). It is not our intention to go into detail about the results, but three important remarks should be made.…”

Section: Defining and Explaining Whistleblowingmentioning

confidence: 98%

Towards a Custom-Made Whistleblowing Policy. Using Grid-Group Cultural Theory to Match Policy Measures to Different Styles of Peer Reporting

Loyens

2012

J Bus Ethics

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Section: Defining and Explaining Whistleblowingmentioning

confidence: 98%

Towards a Custom-Made Whistleblowing Policy. Using Grid-Group Cultural Theory to Match Policy Measures to Different Styles of Peer Reporting

Loyens

2012

J Bus Ethics

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“…In public organizations, there is the possibility of damaging taxpayers through opportunism, for example, by misallocating state funds or by staying on the job even when employees are no longer competent or qualified. Whistleblowers regularly report such misbehavior in public sector organizations (Cropf, 2008;Jos et al, 1989).…”

Section: Can Public Sector Organizations Learn From Benedictine Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monastic Governance: Forgotten Prospects for Public Institutions

Inauen

Rost

Frey

et al. 2010

The American Review of Public Administration

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To overcome agency problems, public sector reforms started to introduce businesslike incentive structures to motivate public officials. By neglecting internal behavioral incentives, however, these reforms often do not reach their stated goals. Our research analyzes the governance structure of Benedictine monasteries in order to gain new insights into solving agency problems in public institutions. A comparison is useful because members of both organizational forms, public organizations and monasteries, see themselves as responsible participants in their community and claim to serve the public good. We study monastic governance from an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and German-speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost 500 years, and only a quarter of them broke up because of agency problems. We argue that they were able to survive for centuries due to an appropriate governance structure, relying strongly on the intrinsic motivation of the members and internal control mechanisms. This governance approach differs in several aspects from current public sector reforms. To overcome agency problems, public sector reforms started to introduce businesslike incentive structures to motivate public officials. By neglecting internal behavioral incentives, however, these reforms often do not reach their stated goals. Our research analyzes the governance structure of Benedictine monasteries in order to gain new insights into solving agency problems in public institutions. A comparison is useful because members of both organizational forms, public organizations and monasteries, see themselves as responsible participants in their community and claim to serve the public good. We study monastic governance from an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and German-speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost 500 years, and only a quarter of them broke up because of agency problems. We argue that they were able to survive for centuries due to an appropriate governance structure, relying strongly on the intrinsic motivation of the members and internal control mechanisms. This governance approach differs in several aspects from current public sector reforms. AbstractTo overcome agency problems, public sector reforms started to introduce businesslike incentive structures to motivate public officials. By neglecting internal behavioral incentives, however, these reforms often do not reach their stated goals. Our research analyzes the governance structure of Benedictine monasteries in order to gain new insights into solving agency problems in public institutions. A comparison is useful because members of both organizational forms, public organizations and monasteries, see themselves as responsible participants in their community and claim to serve the public good. We study monastic governance from an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and German-speaking Switzerland have an averag...

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“…Thus, if a manager reports earnings quality concerns to an external party, there are additional personal costs to consider. For example, the social costs and retaliation faced by employees that blow the whistle externally are significant and well documented (e.g., Carson et al 2008;Jos et al 1989). Dyck et al (2010) anecdotally describe the personal effects for managers who blow the whistle on fraud with consequences including termination, poor job prospects, imprisonment, litigation, and threats/intimidation.…”

Section: H2bmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When reporting externally (e.g., to the external auditor or bank), the manager is increasing the likelihood that any earnings management and/or fraud in the financial statements is not only detected, but also adjusted (i.e., restated). As noted previously, the short-term social costs/retaliations faced by employees that blow the whistle externally are significant and well documented (e.g., Carson et al 2008;Jos et al 1989). To measure this short-term cost, we asked participants in our study:…”

Section: Countervailing Costs Of Reporting Concerns Over Earnings Quamentioning

confidence: 99%

Reporting Concerns about Earnings Quality: An Examination of Corporate Managers

2016

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Using an experiment with corporate financial managers (e.g., CFOs, controllers), we find that when red flags are present in the financial statements under their review, managers identify those red flags and, in turn, have greater concerns over earnings quality. In addition, when pressure to meet a financial target is high, managers are more concerned about earnings quality when red flags are present. We also document that when red flags are present, managers are more likely to report both internally to their CEO and, if their concerns are not resolved internally, externally to their auditor. Pressure to meet a financial target directly influenced the decision to report internally, but not externally. Additional analyses contemplate the countervailing personal costs associated with reporting or not reporting earnings quality concerns. We demonstrate the important role short-term costs play in external reporting decisions. Finally, we provide initial evidence that corporate managers with a longer tenure at their position (public accounting background) are less (more) likely to report externally.

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In Praise of Difficult People: A Portrait of the Committed Whistleblower

Cited by 161 publications

References 8 publications

Towards a Custom-Made Whistleblowing Policy. Using Grid-Group Cultural Theory to Match Policy Measures to Different Styles of Peer Reporting

Towards a Custom-Made Whistleblowing Policy. Using Grid-Group Cultural Theory to Match Policy Measures to Different Styles of Peer Reporting

Monastic Governance: Forgotten Prospects for Public Institutions

Reporting Concerns about Earnings Quality: An Examination of Corporate Managers

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