In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage between Brideprice and Violent Conflict

Abstract

Approximately seventy-five percent of the world's population lives in countries where asset exchange upon marriage is obligatory. Rising brideprice—money or gifts provided to a woman's family by the groom and his family as part of marriage arrangements—is a common if overlooked catalyst of violent conflict. In patrilineal (and some matrilineal) societies where brideprice is practiced, a man's social status is directly connected to his marital status. Brideprice acts as a flat tax that is prone to sudden and swift increases. As a result, rising brideprice can create serious marriage market distortions that prevent young men, especially those who are poor or otherwise marginalized, from marrying. This phenomenon is especially evident in polygamous societies, where wealthy men can afford more than one bride. These distortions incentivize extra-legal asset accumulation, whether through ad hoc raiding or organized violence. In such situations, rebel and terror groups may offer to pay brideprice—or even provide brides—to recruit new members. Descriptive case studies of Boko Haram in Nigeria and various armed groups in South Sudan demonstrate these linkages, while an examination of Saudi Arabia's cap on brideprice and its efforts to arrange low-cost mass weddings illustrates the ways in which governments can intervene in marriage markets to help prevent brideprice-related instability. The trajectory of brideprice is an important but neglected early indicator of societal instability and violent conflict, underscoring that the situation and security of women tangibly affect national security.

Gender Inequality in the Arab World

“…They may join criminal gangs or form militias to acquire status, money, weapons, and women. Examples of the latter include the Islamic State, Boko Haram, and rebel groups in South Sudan (Hudson and Matfess 2017). Men who are reproductively disenfranchised may turn their anger and frustration onto women, engaging in sexual harassment, physical abuse, and sexual assault.…”

In plain sight? Reconsidering the linkage between brideprice and violent conflict

“…An intriguing addition to this literature argues that brideprice may be a critical factor in motivating young men to join groups whose purpose is to engage in organized violence. In a widely-discussed article, Hudson and Matfess (2017) suggest that brideprice is so clearly a cause that propels young men toward violence that it has been ''hidden in plain sight'' all along.…”

“…Specifically, Hudson and Matfess (2017) argue that brideprice inflation generates grievances among young males in patrilineal societies-as they are excluded from the increasingly costly marriage market-making them more likely to join rebellion. If correct, this is an important addition to our understanding of the root causes of political violence, as it would allow for effective policy responses.…”

“…Given these possible benefits, it is important to determine the extent of the relationship between brideprice and political violence. As such, we undertake a thorough examination of Hudson and Matfess's (2017) argument and empirical analysis. We find that they offer a complex and occasionally confusing series of causal claims, alternating between a supplyside theory and a more norms-based argument.…”

“…While both could operate simultaneously, the lack of clarity on this point makes it difficult to generate clear empirical expectations. More importantly, Hudson and Matfess (2017) seemingly vascillate between conceptual discussions of brideprice societies (those in which marital norms entail the net transfer of assets from grooms or their families to brides or their families) and brideprice inflation (the amount of assets demanded in such an exchange). Specifically, they offer a theory of violence for the latter, a quantitative empirical test of the former, and qualitative illustrations of the latter in three case studies.…”