In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence

Parkhurst, Bryan

doi:10.1215/00222909-3651953

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Depictions come in many types (see, e.g., Walton, 1973Walton, , 2008Walton, , 2015. Table 2 lists 15 familiar ways of depicting people.…”

Section: Varieties Of Depictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social robots as depictions of social agents

Clark¹,

Fischer²

2022

Behav Brain Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Social robots serve people as tutors, caretakers, receptionists, companions, and other social agents. People know that the robots are mechanical artifacts, yet they interact with them as if they were actual agents. How is this possible? The proposal here is that people construe social robots not as social agents per se, but as depictions of social agents. They interpret them much as they interpret ventriloquist dummies, hand puppets, virtual assistants, and other interactive depictions of people and animals. Depictions as a class consist of three physical scenes with part-by-part mappings between them: (a) a base scene (the raw physical artifact), (b) the depiction proper (the artifact construed as a depiction), and (c) the scene depicted (the scene people are to imagine). With social robots, evidence shows, people form the same three scenes plus mappings: They perceive the raw machinery of a robot, construe it as a depiction of a character, and, using the depiction as a guide, engage in the pretense that they are interacting with the character depicted. So, with social robots, people also recognize three classes of agents—the characters depicted, the intended recipients of the depictions (those who view or interact with the robots), and the authorities responsible for the robots (the designers, makers, and owners). Construing social robots as depictions, we argue, accounts for many phenomena not covered by alternative models.

show abstract

“…Depictions come in many types (see, e.g., Walton, 1973Walton, , 2008Walton, , 2015. Table 2 lists 15 familiar ways of depicting people.…”

Section: Varieties Of Depictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social robots as depictions of social agents

Clark¹,

Fischer²

2022

Behav Brain Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As an intentional act of perceiving sui generis (Stein 1989), designers 'imagine what it would be like for themselves to be (in the position of) the user' (Kouprie & Sleeswijk Visser 2009, p. 438) through a range of activities of projection, internalisation, objectification, identification and imagination (Thompson 2005;Tellez Bohorquez 2017). Thus, empathy is described through the metaphors of taking a walk in the other person's shoes (Eymard et al 2010;Walton 2015), feeling with another person and imaginatively projecting oneself into the perspective of others (Koskinen & Battarbee 2003), stepping in and out of the lives of users (Kouprie & Sleeswijk Visser 2009), coupling voluntary with the living bodies (Thompson 2005), or a leap of imagination into someone else's head (Walton 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As understood from the literature, empathy relies on a special kind of imaginative experience (Fulton Suri 2003;Walton 2015) including both self-and otheroriented perspectives. While the self-oriented perspective is based on 'how one would think and feel in another's situation, ' other-oriented perspective is based on 'imagining how another feels or thinks' (Batson et al 1997;Batson 2009;Hess & Fila 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, empathy is described through the metaphors of taking a walk in the other person's shoes (Eymard et al . 2010; Walton 2015), feeling with another person and imaginatively projecting oneself into the perspective of others (Koskinen & Battarbee 2003), stepping in and out of the lives of users (Kouprie & Sleeswijk Visser 2009), coupling voluntary with the living bodies (Thompson 2005), or a leap of imagination into someone else's head (Walton 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Eliciting Empathy Embedded in Design Conversations: Empathic Perspective‐Taking of Design Teachers Towards Design Students, Users and Materials

Efilti,

Gelmez

2024

Int J Art Design Ed

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper aims to interrogate the design studio conversations between teachers and students in order to explore the indicators regarding empathy. To investigate design conversations occurring between design teachers and design students, participant observation studies were conducted at two universities in Finland and Turkey. As an empathic indicator, we addressed (1) how design teachers take the perspective of other agencies and (2) what deliveries are utilised for empathic perspective‐taking. It was understood that design teachers identify themselves with both human and non‐human agencies as design students, users and materials. Moreover, deliveries leading to the identification of design teachers with these agencies included both discursive and performative means.

show abstract

“…1 1 Archer and Wojtowicz (2022), Borge (2019), Nguyen (2019a), Scheffler (2013, p. 58), Stear (2017), Velleman (2002), Walton (2015, pp. 75–79), and Wildman (2019).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Who cares about winning?

Baron‐Schmitt

2022

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Why do we so often care about the outcomes of games when nothing is at stake? There is a paradox here, much like the paradox of fiction, which concerns why we care about the fates and threats of merely fictional beings. I argue that the paradox threatens to overturn a great deal of what philosophers have thought about caring, severing its connection to value and undermining its moral weight. I defend a solution to the paradox that draws on Kendall Walton's solution to the paradox of fiction, developing his idea that it be extended to games. The solution takes games to involve make-believe: in particular, players and spectators makebelieve that the outcome of the game matters. I also explore how the phenomenon extends beyond games. And I explore some moral implications: in particular, my view preserves the idea that we have reason not to impede others in their pursuit of what they care about.I do not know whether any aliens are currently observing the Earth. But sometimes I like to imagine that one is. I like to imagine that it is his task to understand human behavior; to figure out what motivates us; to make sense of our actions. His name is Joe. Much of our daily behavior makes sense to Joe. But Joe notices that humans sometimes seem to care immensely about rather odd, unimportant things. Sometimes people seem to care very much about whether an orange sphere goes through a hoop. There is often much disagreement about which hoop the sphere This paper was originally drafted in 2015 but has been revised considerably, both to engage with literature published since (particularly Walton 2015, Stear 2017, and Nguyen 2019(a)), and because numerous people have offered helpful feedback. Those who gave comments on drafts include David Balcarras,

show abstract

In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence

Cited by 10 publications

References 7 publications

Social robots as depictions of social agents

Social robots as depictions of social agents

Eliciting Empathy Embedded in Design Conversations: Empathic Perspective‐Taking of Design Teachers Towards Design Students, Users and Materials

Who cares about winning?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About