In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred

Szanto, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9604-9

Cited by 36 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…For the purposes of this article, I will not consider the enduringness of hate as a separate characteristic. This is because hate can only be enduring if it is maintained, and if it is maintained, then it is enduring.13 Similar views are presented in Ben-Ze'ev (2018: 323-324) andSzanto (2018: 3). 14 Again, this has parallels to love, which is also maintained through direct or indirect interaction.…”

mentioning

confidence: 79%

Could you hate a robot? And does it matter if you could?

Ryland

2021

AI & Soc

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This article defends two claims. First, humans could be in relationships characterised by hate with some robots. Second, it matters that humans could hate robots, as this hate could wrong the robots (by leaving them at risk of mistreatment, exploitation, etc.). In defending this second claim, I will thus be accepting that morally considerable robots either currently exist, or will exist in the near future, and so it can matter (morally speaking) how we treat these robots. The arguments presented in this article make an important original contribution to the robo-philosophy literature, and particularly the literature on human–robot relationships (which typically only consider positive relationship types, e.g., love, friendship, etc.). Additionally, as explained at the end of the article, my discussions of robot hate could also have notable consequences for the emerging robot rights movement. Specifically, I argue that understanding human–robot relationships characterised by hate could actually help theorists argue for the rights of robots.

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confidence: 79%

Could you hate a robot? And does it matter if you could?

Ryland

2021

AI & Soc

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“…There is strong disagreement about the nature of hate. In philosophy, the camps are currently divided between those who consider hate as an emotion (Ben-ze'ev 2018;Elster 1999;Landweer 2020;Steinbock 2019;Szanto 2020) and those who regard it as a sentiment (Deonna and Teroni 2012;Fuchs 2021). For a third group, mainly comprised of psychologists, hate can come in both configurations (Halperin 2008;Halperin et al 2012;Fischer et al 2018; and suggested by Salice 2020).…”

Section: Hate As a Sentimentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sentiments and globalist emotions target the other as a whole, but while sentiments are affective orientations that determine how the other will appear to us, globalist emotions are responses to the other (for Bell, contempt is the appropriate response to the vice of superiority). For a different interpretation of the relation between hate and the globalist emotions, see Szanto (2020).…”

Section: Hate As a Sentimentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hate: toward a Four-Types Model

Ferran

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.

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“…or intergroup level (i.e., "Nazis hate Jewish people.") (Szanto, 2018). That hatred is often focused toward another person is evident in both Solomon's (1993) and Brudholm's (2010) definitions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Hateful Emotional Responses Scale (HatERS): Development and Initial Evaluation

Toussaint

Barry

Enomoto

et al. 2020

jhs

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The present investigation consists of two studies designed to provide a preliminary examination of a new scale for measuring hateful emotional responses to being hurt by an offender. Study 1 involved definition of hateful emotional responses, item development, analysis of internal consistency, and convergent and incremental validity. The scale was evaluated in a sample of 33 young (M = 26) college and community adults. A five-item hateful emotional responses scale was developed and psychometric properties of the scale were encouraging. Study 2 involved using the five-item scale developed and evaluated in Study 1 and examining factorial validity and sensitivity to change in hate as a result of attending a lecture on hate reduction. Results of confirmatory factor analysis showed that the scale had acceptable unidimensional factor structure and standardized loadings were all statistically significant and moderate to large in magnitude. The scale also showed expected sensitivity to change. Study 2 participants were 47 middle-aged (M = 50) churchgoers. These initial results suggest that the scale may hold promise for further development in samples of broader, larger, and more varied individuals, communities, and nations.

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In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred

Cited by 36 publications

References 41 publications

Could you hate a robot? And does it matter if you could?

Could you hate a robot? And does it matter if you could?

Hate: toward a Four-Types Model

Hateful Emotional Responses Scale (HatERS): Development and Initial Evaluation

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