In defense of the possibilism–actualism distinction

Abstract

In his important 2013 book Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson claims that "there is a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with the possibilism-actualism [P-A] distinction" and, indeed, that usage of the terms 'possibilism' and 'actualism' "has become badly confused". The claim is surprising, as the P-A distinction is widely discussed in the philosophical literature and, while there is substantial metaphysical disagreement to be found, there is in fact very little evidence of any deep confusions over exactly what the disagreement concerns. The reason for that, I will argue, is that the distinction is entirely coherent and that Williamson's charges are mostly unwarranted. Specifically, in §1 of this paper I discuss some of the historical antecedents of what I call the modern subsistence conception of the P-A distinction, which I refine in §2. I then turn to Williamson's attack on the P-A distinction in §3 and examine in particular two arguments that he sketches that purport to show that problems will arise for any proposed definition of the distinction; I find both arguments wanting. In §4 I discuss Williamson's preferred distinction between necessitism and contingentism and argue that, broadened so as to enable necessitists to fend My thanks to

Symmetry and Hybrid Contingentism

“…This terminology is fromWilliamson (2013). See alsoMenzel (2020) for a recent discussion of the relationship between necessitism/contingentism and the actualism/possibilism distinction.…”

Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism

“…see Williamson, 2013; Deasy, 2017), but I will be working with the assumption that these standard concepts are at least helpful starting points in framing the relevant debates (e.g. see Cameron, 2016, Menzel, 2020; Ingram & Tallant, 2021).…”