In Defense of International Investment Law

Schill, Stephan W.

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_13

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 40 publications

(13 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…On the other hand, some maintain that these criticisms are not backed by evidence (Alvarez and Willinski, 2016;Schill, 2016). For instance, on the issue of the ISDS system being dominated by arbitrators from developed countries who are biased against developing countries, Franck's research shows that statistically, the outcome of investment treaty arbitration is not reliably linked with the development status of the presiding arbitrator (Franck, 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) cases and India: affronting regulatory autonomy or indicting capricious state behaviour?

Ranjan

2021

JITLP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose The dominant narrative in the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) system is that it enables powerful corporations to encroach upon the regulatory power of developing countries aimed at pursuing compelling public interest objectives. The example of Phillip Morris, the tobacco giant, suing Uruguay’s public health measures is cited as the most significant example to prove this thesis. The other side of the story that States abuse their public power to undermine the protected rights of foreign investors does not get much attention. Design/methodology/approach This paper reviews all the ISDS cases that India has lost to ascertain the reason why these claims were brought against India in the first place. The approach of the paper is to study these ISDS cases to find out whether these cases arose due to abuse of the State’s public power or affronted India’s regulatory autonomy. Findings Against this global context, this paper studies the ISDS claims brought against India, one of the highest respondent-State in ISDS, to show that they arose due to India’s capricious behaviour. Analysis of these cases reveals that India acted in bad faith and abused its public power by either amending laws retroactively or by scrapping licences without following due process or going back on specific and written assurances that induced investors to invest. In none of these cases, the foreign investors challenged India’s regulatory measures aimed at advancing the genuine public interest. The absence of a “Phillip Morris moment” in India’s ISDS story is a stark reminder that one should give due weight to the equally compelling narrative that ISDS claims are also a result of abuse of public power by States. Originality/value The originality value of this paper arises from the fact that this is the first comprehensive study of ISDS cases brought against India and provides full documentation within the larger global context of rising ISDS cases. The paper contributes to the debate on international investment law by showing that in the case of India most of the ISDS cases brought were due to India abusing its public power and was not an affront on India’s regulatory autonomy.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%