In Defense of Good Reasons

Berkson, William

doi:10.1177/004839319002000105

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…William Berkson has suggested that Bartley so concentrated on the logic of the problem of rationality posed by Popper's view that he falsely presumed that the purpose 81 this view was designed to serve could be fulfilled if the logical problem could be solved. 26 We find, then, various partial views of rationality, and we do so even if we all see the core of rationality in criticism. Are these various views each acceptable even though they make recommendations that contradict each other?…”

Section: Bartley's Making the Standard Comprehensive Increases Its Scmentioning

confidence: 83%

Styles of Rationality

Wettersten

1995

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article discusses the following: (i) The acceptability of diverse styles of rationality suggests replacing concern for uniqueness with that for coordination, (ii) Popper's lowering of the standard of rationality increases its scope insufficiently, (iii) Bartley's making the standard comprehensive increases its scope excessively, (iv) the pluralist view of rationality as partial (i.e., of Jarvie and Agassi) is better, but its ranking of all rationality eliminates choice of styles, (v) styles diversify the standards of rationality, (viii) rationality is not merely a matter of style, (vi) (vii) diversity raises new, interesting problems, allowing diversity permits reconciling differences better than does the absent unique standard, and (ix) cultural heritage and rationality are complementary.

show abstract

Section: Bartley's Making the Standard Comprehensive Increases Its Scmentioning

confidence: 83%

Styles of Rationality

Wettersten

1995

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Popper describes uncritical/comprehensive rationalism as the attitude of the person who says "I am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be defended by means of argument or experience" ; the principle that any assumption which cannot be supported either by argument or by experience is to be discarded . 5 There are two main objections to this view. First, the acceptance of rationalism itself cannot be a matter of its being justified by argument or experience: neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them .…”

Section: The Residual Problem Of Justification and Popper's-bartley's...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, the acceptance of rationalism itself cannot be a matter of its being justified by argument or experience: neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them . 6 5 Popper K. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol.…”

Section: The Residual Problem Of Justification and Popper's-bartley's...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Karl Popper’s Solution to the Problem of Induction and the Non-Justificationist Conception of Rationality

Сепетий¹

2021

APD

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The article provides a detailed account and elucidation of Karl Popper’s solution to Hume’s problem of induction. It is pointed out that the solution has two major aspects. The first, explicitly described by Popper as his solution to the problem of induction, is the replacement of the inductivist account of the development of empirical knowledge, according to which cognition begins with observations of particular events and proceeds through inductive inferences to certainly true or highly probable theories-generalisations, with the hypothetico-deductivist account, according to which cognition begins with a problem and proceeds through conjecturing its possible solutions (advancing hypotheses) and attempts to falsify them by reproducible results of observations/experiments. The second aspect has to do with the problem of justification of the hypothetico-deductivist account (which replaces Hume’s problem of the justification of induction). This problem is shown to be dealt with within Popper’s-Bartley’s general solution to the problem of justification, usually described as «non-justificationism», which admits the impossibility of absolute definitive justification (for any position) and replaces the search for such justification with the evaluation of relative advantages/disadvantages of competing approaches, which can provide us with reasons to prefer or tentatively accept one of them. The comparison is made between Popper’s hypotheticodeductivist account and Charles Pierce’s account based on abduction, or inference to the best explanation. It is shown that these accounts has similar logical structures, that with respect to empirical science they suggest mutual corrections and clarifications, and that inference to the best explanation can provide justification for the assumption of the existence of laws of nature, which is implicit in the hypothetico-deductivist account.

show abstract

Rationalism Critical and Pancritical: What Did Popper and Bartley Disagree About?

Sepetyi

2024

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In Defense of Good Reasons

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Styles of Rationality

Styles of Rationality

Karl Popper’s Solution to the Problem of Induction and the Non-Justificationist Conception of Rationality

Rationalism Critical and Pancritical: What Did Popper and Bartley Disagree About?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About