In defense of consequentializing1

Dreier, Jamie

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.003.0005

Cited by 98 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…It is entirely possible, for instance, that di↵erent normative theories entail the same permissibility verdicts, despite arriving at them in di↵erent ways. Several authors have recognized this phenomenon, sometimes under the label of "extensional equivalence" (e.g., Portmore 2011, Dreier 2011, and ear-lier, Lyons 1965. 5 A striking suggestion of extensional equivalence can be found in Derek Parfit's book, On What Matters (2011).…”

Section: Normative Theories and Their Deontic Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some scholars, such as Dreier (2011), think that there is not much at stake in such cases of underdetermination. This view parallels the instrumentalist one in science.…”

Section: Normative Theories and Their Deontic Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If we permit redescriptions of the options, we can trivially represent any rightness function in terms of a binary relation. This can be viewed as a variant of the Extensional Equivalence Thesis defended by Dreier (2011) and Portmore (2007), according to which every set of action-guiding recommendations has some consequentialist representation, under a su ciently permissive notion of consequences. 62 Let R be any rightness function defined on K. Formally, R maps each context K in K to a subset of [K].…”

Section: A2 Consequentializing By Redescribing the Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 Roughly speaking, a moral theory is "consequentializable" if its action-guiding recommendations are the same as those of some "counter-part theory" that is structurally consequentialist. 2 Some scholars, such as Jamie Dreier (1993Dreier ( , 2011 and Douglas Portmore (2007), suggest that every moral theory -or at least every plausible one -can be represented in a consequentialist format, provided we employ a su ciently broad notion of consequences. Others, such as Campbell Brown (2011, 750), argue that " [t]here are in fact limits to consequentialization": whenever a moral theory does not satisfy certain formal constraints, it defies consequentialization, in a sense that can be made precise.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Matters and How It Matters: A Choice-Theoretic Representation of Moral Theories

Dietrich¹,

List²

2017

Philosophical Review

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We present a new "reason-based" approach to the formal representation of moral theories, drawing on recent decision-theoretic work. We show that any moral theory within a very large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a specification of which properties of the objects of moral choice matter in any given context, and (ii) a specification of how these properties matter. Reasonbased representations provide a very general taxonomy of moral theories, as di↵er-ences among theories can be attributed to di↵erences in their two key parameters. We can thus formalize several distinctions, such as between consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories, between universalist and relativist theories, between agent-neutral and agent-relative theories, between monistic and pluralistic theories, between atomistic and holistic theories, and between theories with a teleological structure and those without. Reason-based representations also shed light on an important but under-appreciated phenomenon: the "underdetermination of moral theory by deontic content".

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Section: Normative Theories and Their Deontic Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some scholars, such as Dreier (2011), think that there is not much at stake in such cases of underdetermination. This view parallels the instrumentalist one in science.…”

Section: Normative Theories and Their Deontic Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A2 Consequentializing By Redescribing the Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

What Matters and How It Matters: A Choice-Theoretic Representation of Moral Theories

Dietrich¹,

List²

2017

Philosophical Review

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“…See Sen ; Dreier and ; Smith and ; Louise ; Portmore and . For criticism see Regan and Schroeder and .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fault Line in Ethical Theory

Nair

2014

Philosophical Perspectives

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Paradox of Deontology

Hurley

2024

International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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Intuitively, it is wrong to kill even to prevent two other people from killing. Consequentialists have argued that reflection on such moral restrictions engenders an air of paradox: how can it be morally wrong to lie or kill if by doing so I prevent more lyings and killings? The air of paradox arises because the persisting intuitive appeal of such restrictions is called into question by the attempt to explain their deep intuitive appeal. The threat of paradox can be dissipated by demonstrating either that the intuitive appeal of such restrictions dissipates on reflection, or by showing that there is after all a plausible theoretical explanation for them. Both consequentialists and their opponents have recently offered theoretical explanations supporting such restrictions. Consequentialist strategies propose either shifting the focal point of evaluations away from actions to rules or motives, or refining the standpoints from which the outcomes to be promoted are ranked. Their critics argue that there are perfectly good, nonparadoxical explanations of such restrictions through appeal to value, but that such explanations are elided from view by the assumption, built into the case for paradox, that any such appeal to the value must be an appeal to the value of outcomes to be promoted. Reject the consequentialist's outcome‐centered constraint on value, they argue, and plausible explanations are readily available for why it is much worse to violate such a restriction even though the outcome of doing so would in some sense be better.

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In defense of consequentializing1

Cited by 98 publications

References 0 publications

What Matters and How It Matters: A Choice-Theoretic Representation of Moral Theories

What Matters and How It Matters: A Choice-Theoretic Representation of Moral Theories

A Fault Line in Ethical Theory

Paradox of Deontology

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