In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions

Bayne, Tim; Pacherie, Élisabeth

doi:10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00281.x

Cited by 120 publications

(104 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…This is a widely shared view of delusions in the psychological and psychiatric literature, and it has been convincingly defended in the philosophical literature as well (e.g., Bayne and Pacherie 2005;Bortolotti 2009). That said, in philosophy there is growing scepticism about the doxastic nature of delusions (e.g., Schwitzgebel 2012;Gerrans 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 78%

The Ethics of Delusional Belief

Bortolotti

Miyazono

2015

Erkenn

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In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to (1) acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, (2) establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and (3) introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 78%

The Ethics of Delusional Belief

Bortolotti

Miyazono

2015

Erkenn

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“…This view takes its name from 'doxa' , Greek word for belief or opinion, and its main tenet is that delusions are better understood as a type of belief (Bayne and Pacherie, 2005;Bortolotti, 2010Bortolotti, , 2012Bayne and Hattiangadi, 2013) 7 . Contrasting with other views on the same pro lem, here, beliefs are broa ly understood as propositional attitudes 8 .…”

Section: A Potential Solution?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The typology problem and the doxastic approach to delusions

López-Silva

2016

Filosofia Unisinos

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This paper explores one of the most fundamental philosophical worries underlying the occurrence of delusions, namely, the problem about the specific type of mental state that grounds a delusional report or, as I shall call it, 'the typology problem'. The analysis is developed as follows: (i) After formulating and circumscribing the target problem, (ii) I explore the main tenets and advantages of the doxastic view of delusions, perhaps, the strongest candidate currently available within the typology debate. (iii) After, I clarify and evaluate four of the main counter-arguments against the doxastic view offering a number of counter replies to these attacks. (iv) Finally, I conclude that the anti-doxastic argumentation offers no good reasons to abandon the doxastic model and that this model does not need to appeal to external resources to reply to such counter-arguments. At the same time, I finalize with some of the challenges that remain open within the doxastic view.Keywords: psychosis, delusions, doxastic view of delusions, typology problem. RESUMOEsse artigo explora uma das preocupações filosóficas mais fundamentais que subjazem à manifestação de delírios, a saber, o problema do tipo específico de estado mental que fundamenta um relato de delírio -o que chamarei de 'problema tipológico'. A análise empreendida é desenvolvida do seguinte modo: (i) Após formular e circunscrever o problema-alvo, (ii) exploro os principais comprometimentos e vantagens da explicação doxástica dos delírios, que é talvez a mais forte dentre as soluções propostas dentro do debate tipológico. (iii) A seguir, esclareço e avalio quatro dos principais argumentos contra a explicação doxástica, oferecendo réplicas a esses ataques. (iv) Finalmente, concluo que a argumentação anti-doxástica não oferece boas razões para abandonarmos o modelo doxástico e argumento que esse modelo não precisa apelar a recursos externos para responder aos argumentos anti-doxásticos. Termino o artigo expondo alguns desafios ao modelo doxásti-co que permanecem em aberto.Palavras-chave: psicose, delírios, visão doxástica de delírios, problema tipológico.

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“…9 I borrow this expression from Tim Bayne, who suggested it in a talk in January 2011. On the issue whether delusional beliefs are genuine beliefs ( and for a positive answer) see Bayne and Pacherie (2005). For the opposing view, see Currie and Ravencroft (2002).…”

Section: Two Systems Of Doxastic Attitudes or One?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust and the doxastic family

Engel¹

2012

Philos Stud

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SummaryThis article examines Keith Lehrer's distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer's notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the "loop of reason", whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in his analysis of reason.

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In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions

Cited by 120 publications

References 44 publications

The Ethics of Delusional Belief

The Ethics of Delusional Belief

The typology problem and the doxastic approach to delusions

Trust and the doxastic family

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