In defence of object-given reasons

Abstract

One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude is that object-given reasons for or against belief and disbelief are incapable of explaining certain features of epistemic normativity. Prohibitive balancing, the behaviour of bare statistical evidence, information about future or easily available evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, as well as higher-order defeaters, are all said to be inexplicable in terms of those object-given reasons. In this paper, I provide a rebuttal to all these challenges by drawing attention to the object-given reasons for and against the third doxastic state, namely the suspension of judgement. First, I introduce an original picture of how suspension relates to belief and disbelief – as ways of being decided – which yields a novel weighing model of the corresponding reasons. Second, I demonstrate that this new take on doxastic deliberation can accommodate all five features of epistemic normativity. Finally, I extend the weighing model to cover practical deliberation and the suspension of intentions. The resulting theory provides an explanation of why epistemic and practical normativity differ in certain respects in terms of a significant difference between doxastic and conative suspension.

Against zetetic encroachment

“…While suspension itself is not directly sensitive to practical considerations such as monetary incentives nor to zetetic reasons, as established in this paper, one might still find a difference between Low Stakes and High Stakes which could be relevant for the RKRs of suspension. For instance, as I argued elsewhere, there could be a difference in the salient error possibilities between these situations, and unexcluded salient possibilities of error might very well be RKRs in favour of the third doxastic option (Vollmer, 2024).…”

“…As Snedegar (2017) and Tucker (forthcoming) argue, accepting that evidence that p can be both a reason in favour of believing p rather than disbelieving p or suspending judgement on p, as well as a reason in favour of suspending rather than disbelieving can help circumvent the many puzzles of evidential ties. Or, as I recently proposed, one can achieve the same results by arguing that evidence is a reason to believe p rather than disbelieve p, but not a reason to believe p rather than suspend as to whether p (Vollmer, 2024). Both ways of construing epistemic reasons are independently motivated.…”

“…Yet, one might resist the thesis that this fact would make curiosity towards such questions unfitting.20 In her recent work, Anne Meylan proposes such a way of handling Schroeder's cases. InVollmer (2024), I propose a different solution: information about forthcoming evidence can make additional possibilities of error salient. I take it that my analysis is closer to the phenomenology of such scenarios.…”