“…The view that race is a social kind is the most popular position in the philosophical literature on 'race' (Diaz-Leon, 2015;Haslanger, 2012;Mallon, 2017;Mills, 1998;Msimang, 2019Msimang, , 2019Pierce, 2014;Sundstrom, 2002a;Taylor, 2013). The idea of social kinds can be understood by way of analogy with kinds from the physical sciences, like gold.…”
As belief in the reality of race as a biological category among U.S. anthropologists has fallen, belief in the reality of race as a social category has risen in its place. The view that race simply does not exist-that it is a myth-is treated with suspicion. While racial classification is linked to many of the worst evils of recent history, it is now widely believed to be necessary to fight back against racism. In this paper, I argue that race is indeed a biological fiction, but I critique the claim that race is socially real. I defend a form of anti-realist reconstructionism about race, which says that there are no races, only racialized groups-groups mistakenly believed to be races. I argue that this is the most attractive position about race from a metaphysical perspective, and that it is also the position most conductive to public understanding and social justice.
“…The view that race is a social kind is the most popular position in the philosophical literature on 'race' (Diaz-Leon, 2015;Haslanger, 2012;Mallon, 2017;Mills, 1998;Msimang, 2019Msimang, , 2019Pierce, 2014;Sundstrom, 2002a;Taylor, 2013). The idea of social kinds can be understood by way of analogy with kinds from the physical sciences, like gold.…”
As belief in the reality of race as a biological category among U.S. anthropologists has fallen, belief in the reality of race as a social category has risen in its place. The view that race simply does not exist-that it is a myth-is treated with suspicion. While racial classification is linked to many of the worst evils of recent history, it is now widely believed to be necessary to fight back against racism. In this paper, I argue that race is indeed a biological fiction, but I critique the claim that race is socially real. I defend a form of anti-realist reconstructionism about race, which says that there are no races, only racialized groups-groups mistakenly believed to be races. I argue that this is the most attractive position about race from a metaphysical perspective, and that it is also the position most conductive to public understanding and social justice.
“…Race must therefore also be understood as a cultural phenomenon” (Jeffers, , 420). “Social constructivism about races holds that races are socially real, that is, they are identical with socially constructed properties, or social kinds . One particular version of social constructivism, namely, historical constructivism , claims that the properties that make a group of people a race are certain historical properties of the individuals that belong to that group (e.g., the life histories of the members of the group, or their ancestors)” (Díaz‐Leon, , 547).…”
Section: Is Race Real In Any Ordinary Use Of “Race”?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Others, like Chike Jeffers (), have argued that race is real as a political and cultural construct. While others, like Esa Díaz‐Leon (), have argued that race is real as a socio‐historical construct. Due to space constraints, I will just discuss Haslanger's defense of social racial realism.…”
Section: Is Race Real In Any Ordinary Use Of “Race”?mentioning
This article is Part II in a pair of articles on racial realism. In Part I, Idefined "racial realism" and discussed the major attempts in the past twenty years among metaphysicians of race and biologists to defend racial realism from the viewpoint of what biologists mean by "race." In this article, I continue discussing and critiquing how metaphysicians of race have conceived of and defended racial realism, but with a focus on how ordinary people use "race." I focus on two broad groups of racial realisms in this article: biological racial realism and social racial realism. After defining each one, Isummarize a representative sample of recent attempts from metaphysicians of race to defend both types of racial realism. I also
“…Social constructionism has been understood as the view that biological race is an illusion, or is otherwise arbitrary, contingent, and conventional (Bobo 2008: x;Gannett 2010;Hochman 2013a), that biological races are literally the products of social forces (Kitcher 1999;Outlaw 1996), and that race is a real social kind (Diaz-Leon 2015;Haslanger 2012;mills 1998;Sundstrom 2002b;Taylor 2004). notice that these are very different theories.…”
Section: What's Wrong With Social Constructionism About Race?mentioning
in this paper i defend anti-realism about race and a new theory of racialization. i argue that there are no races, only racialized groups. many social constructionists about race have adopted racial formation theory to explain how 'races' are formed. However, anti-realists about race cannot adopt racial formation theory, because it assumes the reality of race. i introduce interactive constructionism about racialized groups as a theory of racialization for anti-realists about race. interactive constructionism moves the discussion away from the dichotomous (social vs. biological) metaphysics that has marred this debate, and posits that racialized groups are the joint products of a broad range of non-racial factors, which interact.
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