Improving Secrecy Rate via Spectrum Leasing for Friendly Jamming

Abstract

Abstract-Cooperative jamming paradigm in secure communications enlists network nodes to transmit noise or structured codewords, in order to impair the eavesdropper's ability to decode messages to be kept confidential from it. Such an approach can significantly help in facilitating secure communication between legitimate parties but, by definition, assumes dedicated and/or altruistic nodes willing to act as cooperative jammers. In this paper, it is demonstrated that cooperative jamming leads to meaningful secrecy rate improvements even when this assumption is removed. A distributed mechanism is developed that motivates jamming participation of otherwise non-cooperative terminals, by compensating them with an opportunity to use the fraction of legitimate parties' spectrum for their own data traffic. With the goal of maximizing their data transmission rate priced by the invested power, cooperative jammers provide the jamming/transmitting power that is generally proportional to the amount of leased bandwidth. The fully decentralized framework is facilitated through a game-theoretic model, with the legitimate parties as the spectrum owners acting as the game leader, and the set of assisting jammers constituting the follower. To facilitate the behavior of non-cooperative and competitive multiple jammers, auctioning and power control mechanisms are applied for a follower sub-game in a two-layer leader-follower game framework.

Improving Wireless Security for Cooperation of Untrusted Secondary Transmitters

“…But, in our second-price sealed-bid auction model, the utilities of the auctioneer and winning bidder may increase or decrease simultaneously in some specific ranges of sw P due to their concavity. Therefore we slightly modify the second-price sealed-bid auction scheme [11]: the winning bidder must provide at least the second highest bid. In this setting, the winning ST w may maximize its own utility by adjusting the transmit power The outcome of the modified second-price sealed-bid auction is summed up in Theorem2.…”

A Survey on Cooperative Jamming Applied to Physical Layer Security

“…A multi-relay network is considered in [13] that consists of both malicious and cooperative relays, and applies Nash equilibrium game strategy on its scheme, by modelling the cooperative relays set and the malicious relays set as two players in a zero sum game with the maximum achievable rate as the utility. The authors in [46] propose another game-theoretic model, Stackelberg game, with the legitimate parties being spectrum owners acting as a game leader, and the set of the assisting jammers which are constituting the follower. It shows that when the potential jammers' number increases, utility of a chosen jammer for any scheme will start to decrease as the legitimate parties can be more aggressive when leading the game.…”

Feasibility of positive secrecy rate in wiretap interference channels

“…The achievable rate region for both primary and secondary users is derived when secondary user causes interference to both primary and eavesdropper. A network comprised of single-antenna nodes is considered in [16] where a transceiver pair need to keep the transmission secret from an eavesdropper. Game theory is used to analyze the interaction between this pair and other nodes which act as cooperative jammers.…”