We investigate whether hospitals in the English National Health Service change their quality or efficiency in response to changes in quality or efficiency of neighbouring hospitals. We first provide a theoretical model that predicts that a hospital will not respond to changes in the efficiency of its rivals but may change its quality or efficiency in response to changes in the quality of rivals, though the direction of the response is ambiguous. We use data on eight quality measures (including mortality, emergency readmissions, patient reported outcome, and patient satisfaction) and six efficiency measures (including bed occupancy, cancelled operations, and costs) for public hospitals between 2010/11 and 2013/14 to estimate both spatial cross-sectional and spatial fixed-and random-effects panel data models. We find that although quality and efficiency measures are unconditionally spatially correlated, the spatial regression models suggest that a hospital's quality or efficiency does not respond to its rivals' quality or efficiency, except for a hospital's overall mortality that is positively associated with that of its rivals. The results are robust to allowing for spatially correlated covariates and errors and to instrumenting rivals' quality and efficiency. KEYWORDS competition, efficiency, hospitals, quality, spatial econometrics
| INTRODUCTIONQuality and efficiency are fundamental goals for policymakers in the hospital sector. In the presence of fixed prices, policymakers have argued that competition may induce hospitals to compete on quality to attract patients and to enhance their efficiency (Gaynor, 2007). Investigations of the effect of competition on quality and efficiency in the United States, the U.K., and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries have produced mixed results (Section 1.1).In this study, rather than examining the relationship between measures of competition and hospital quality and efficiency, we use an alternative approach by examining hospitals' strategic interactions. For example, in a competitive environment, we may expect a hospital to respond to an increase in quality by a rival hospital by also increasing quality: in industrial economics terms, qualities are strategic complements. We present a simple theory model (Section 2) that shows that this intuition can be correct if treatment costs are increasing in quality. The reduction in demand that follows from an increase in rival's quality reduces total treatment cost of providing quality and at the margin incentivises the Received: 17 November 2016 Revised: 3 July 2017 Accepted: 4 July 2017 hospital to increase quality. There is however an offsetting effect: the reduction in demand also reduces incentives to contain cost that reduces the profit margin on additional patients. We therefore investigate empirically whether quality and efficiency are strategic complements or strategic substitutes so that higher rivals' quality (efficiency) induces a hospital to increase or reduce its quality (effic...