Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail

Papanastasiou, Yiangos; Yang, S. Alex; Zhang, Angela Huyue

doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 32 publications

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“…They showed that in a two-sided market, two platforms of different sizes can coexist under the influence of negative group endogeneity, even though the larger platform is more efficient. Papanastasiou et al [31] argued that negative consumer ratings affect the platform's future revenues. If companies can delete reviews on their own and penalize violations, this can effectively mitigate the negative impact on the platform.…”

Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fly with social platform? Two-sided platform cooperation and pricing strategy considering same-side crowding out

Zhu,

Shi,

et al. 2024

JIMO

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The cooperation between two-sided platforms and social media platforms has become an emerging business model, with social platforms utilizing their extensive reach to attract fresh traffic to the two-sided platforms. However, with the expansion of the user base on these platforms, there is a potential for crowding out effects among users with similar interests. Meanwhile, determining whether the promotion on social platforms can generate profits for two-sided platform apps poses a significant challenge. To address this deficiency, a model is proposed to investigate the cooperative relationship between two-sided platforms and social platform under different user attribution scenarios. We utilize the Hotelling framework to analyze the competition between two-sided platforms in scenarios where neither platform cooperates with social media, and one platform does. Our analysis aims to survey whether such cooperation leads to increased profits or higher prices for the platform. The results indicate that: (1) When users are single-homing, same-side crowding-out has a stimulating effect on platform profits and prices. In contrast, cross-side network effects have a reverse effect. (2) Basic utility and cross-side network effects promote multi-homing behavior. When users on both sides are multihoming, cooperation will result in a higher price for both two-sided platforms.(3) A two-sided platform that does not cooperate with social media is not necessarily at a significant disadvantage. If the cross-side network effects are large enough, such a platform can still gain an advantage. (4) A cooperating twosided platform should strive to attract more traffic through the promotion of a social media platform, which can be beneficial to both competing two-sided platforms. Our findings provide useful managerial insights into cooperation strategies between two-sided platforms and social media platforms.

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Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fly with social platform? Two-sided platform cooperation and pricing strategy considering same-side crowding out

Zhu,

Shi,

et al. 2024

JIMO

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Crowd-Judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of In-Group Bias

2024

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Disputes over transactions on two-sided platforms are common and usually arbitrated through platforms’ customer service departments or third-party service providers. This paper studies crowd-judging, a novel crowdsourcing mechanism whereby users (buyers and sellers) volunteer as jurors to decide disputes arising from the platform. Using a rich data set from the dispute resolution center at Taobao, a leading Chinese e-commerce platform, we aim to understand this innovation and propose and analyze potential operational improvements with a focus on in-group bias (buyer jurors favor the buyer, likewise for sellers). Platform users, especially sellers, share the perception that in-group bias is prevalent and systematically sways case outcomes as the majority of users on such platforms are buyers, undermining the legitimacy of crowd-judging. Our empirical findings suggest that such concern is not completely unfounded: on average, a seller juror is approximately 10% likelier (than a buyer juror) to vote for a seller. Such bias is aggravated among cases that are decided by a thin margin and when jurors perceive that their in-group’s interests are threatened. However, the bias diminishes as jurors gain experience: a user’s bias reduces by nearly 95% as experience grows from zero to the sample median level. Incorporating these findings and juror participation dynamics in a simulation study, the paper delivers three managerial insights. First, under the existing voting policy, in-group bias influences the outcomes of no more than 2% of cases. Second, simply increasing crowd size through either a larger case panel or aggressively recruiting new jurors may not be efficient in reducing the adverse effect of in-group bias. Finally, policies that allocate cases dynamically could simultaneously mitigate the impact of in-group bias and nurture a more sustainable juror pool. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Funding: S. A. Yang and A. Zhang acknowledge the support of the Hong Kong General Research Fund [Grant “Decentralizing Platform Governance: Innovations from China; Project 17614921]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4818 .

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Should Gig Platforms Decentralize Dispute Resolution?

Lee,

Cui

2024

M&SOM

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Problem definition: Disputes on online labor platforms have traditionally been mediated by the platform itself, which is often viewed as unhelpful or biased. However, there are emerging platforms that promise to resolve disputes with a novel tribunal system and relegate dispute resolution to individual platform users through a voting mechanism. We aim to examine the dispute resolution systems used by traditional platforms (i.e., the centralized dispute system) and emerging platforms (i.e., the decentralized dispute system) in order to assess whether the latter has an advantage over the former. Methodology/results: We use game theory to analyze both the centralized and decentralized dispute systems, and we model the tribunal’s voting game using the global games framework. Our findings indicate that in order to achieve a fair voting outcome, it is crucial to have sufficient heterogeneity in the assessments of tribunal members. Moreover, the decentralized dispute system outperforms the centralized dispute system only when the freelancer’s skill level is sufficiently high. Lastly, the decentralized dispute system has the potential to induce a more socially optimal quality level from the freelancer. Managerial implications: Our findings provide insights on the optimal adoption and implementation of the decentralized dispute system. The decentralized dispute system is more effective for tasks that involve subjective evaluations, and platforms should avoid strategies that homogenize the assessments of tribunal members. Moreover, platforms should consider switching to the decentralized dispute system only if they are able to verify the skill level of freelancers through certification or other means. Lastly, the decentralized dispute system may be more appealing to policy makers because of its potential to induce a more socially optimal outcome. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0398 .

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Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail

Cited by 4 publications

References 32 publications

Fly with social platform? Two-sided platform cooperation and pricing strategy considering same-side crowding out

Fly with social platform? Two-sided platform cooperation and pricing strategy considering same-side crowding out

Crowd-Judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of In-Group Bias

Should Gig Platforms Decentralize Dispute Resolution?

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