Improvement of the RFID authentication scheme based on quadratic residues

A Location-Privacy-Protected RFID Authentication Scheme

“…Later, Cao and Shen indicated that Chen et al's scheme cannot resist impersonation attack [15]. Yeh et al further found that Chen et al's scheme cannot protect location privacy and proposed an improvement [14]. After thorough investigation, we find that the server needs to maintain the obsolete shared secret key to resist DoS (Denial of Service) attack in both Chen et al's and Yeh et al's schemes.…”

“…Recently, many RFID schemes have been proposed for location privacy protection. According to utilized methods, these schemes can be divided into two categories: pseudonym [7,8] and shared secret update [2,3,[9][10][11][12][13][14]. In the first category, the server and the tag preshare a series of pseudonyms.…”

A novel mutual authentication scheme with minimum disclosure for RFID systems

“…However, cryptanalysis of the scheme by Cao and Shen [24] shows that the scheme is vulnerable to tag impersonation attacks, replay attacks and tag location disclosure. Chen's scheme was improved by Yeh and Wu [25] by having the tag generate an additional random number. However, since PAP and both the original quadratic residue based scheme and the improved version require the tag to compute multiple hash functions they are not suitable for EPC Class-1 Gen-2 tags.…”

“…In our mutual authentication scheme and those proposed by Chien [29], Chen [23],Yeh [25] and Chen [27] the channel between the reader and the server is assumed to be secure. Hence there is no reader-server authentication that is built into the schemes.…”

RFID Authentication with Un-Traceability and Forward Secrecy in the Partial-Distributed-Server Model

“…RFID authentication has been intensively studied by researchers like [2]- [6], [11]- [26]. The security features of extant schemes have been improved to some extent, but only few of them simultaneously considered anonymity, un-traceability and forward secrecy.…”