Improvement of a Privacy Authentication Scheme Based on Cloud for Medical Environment

Abstract

Medical systems allow patients to receive care at different hospitals. However, this entails considerable inconvenience through the need to transport patients and their medical records between hospitals. The development of Telecare Medicine Information Systems (TMIS) makes it easier for patients to seek medical treatment and to store and access medical records. However, medical data stored in TMIS is not encrypted, leaving patients' private data vulnerable to external leaks. In 2014, scholars proposed a new cloud-based medical information model and authentication scheme which would not only allow patients to remotely access medical services but also protects patient privacy. However, this scheme still fails to provide patient anonymity and message authentication. Furthermore, this scheme only stores patient medical data, without allowing patients to directly access medical advice. Therefore, we propose a new authentication scheme, which provides anonymity, unlinkability, and message authentication, and allows patients to directly and remotely consult with doctors. In addition, our proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of computation cost. The proposed system was implemented in Android system to demonstrate its workability.

Cryptanalysis and improvement of a biometric‐based remote user authentication protocol usable in a multiserver environment

“…To evaluate execution time of our scheme with other existing schemes, the hash function, bio-hash function, symmetric key encryption or decryption operation, modular exponentiation operation, elliptic curve point multiplication, and bilinear operation take 0.0005, 0.02102, 0.0087, 0.522, 0.0503, and 0.0621 seconds, respectively. 59,60 As in the work of He et al, 68 the execution time for a fuzzy extractor function is near about equal to an elliptic curve point multiplication. The estimated computational time of the protocols of Amin and Biswas, 30 Irshad et al, 51 Li et al, 18 Maitra et al, 19 Li et al, 52 Lin et al, 53 Maitra and Giri, 54 Pippal et al, 16 Wen et al, 55 Yoon and Yoo, 56 and Amin and Biswas, 44 and our proposed protocol are 0.05404, 0.7684, 2.098, 0.0652, 0.4164, 0.2609, 0.0438, 3.658, 0.095, 0.2112, 0.98304, and 0.8701 seconds, respectively.…”

“…Our proposed protocol has computation costs 7 T h +2 T p m +1 T f e and 23 T h +13 T p m +1 T f e for the registration phase and the login and authentication phase, respectively, whereas the other schemes have 24 T h +2 T b h , 24 T h +12 T p m +6 T s +2 T f e , 20 T h +4 T m e , 26 T h +6 T s , 28 T h +6 T p m +2 T f e , 15 T h +4 T p m +6 T s , 18 T h +4 T s , 9 T h +7 T m e , 16 T h +10 T s , 20 T h +4 T p m , and 24 T h +16 T p m +2 T b p +2 T b h operations, respectively, for performing the registration phase and the authentication phase. To evaluate execution time of our scheme with other existing schemes, the hash function, bio‐hash function, symmetric key encryption or decryption operation, modular exponentiation operation, elliptic curve point multiplication, and bilinear operation take 0.0005, 0.02102, 0.0087, 0.522, 0.0503, and 0.0621 seconds, respectively . As in the work of He et al, the execution time for a fuzzy extractor function is near about equal to an elliptic curve point multiplication.…”

An Efficient Three-Party Authentication Scheme for Data Exchange in Medical Environment

“…Any identity communicates with each other via an insecure public channel, offering adversaries opportunities to intercept. In the following, we present the assumptions of the attacker model [18][19][20][21].…”

Fuzzy Extractor and Elliptic Curve Based Efficient User Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks and Internet of Things

“…The execution time as considered in [35,36], for the different cryptographic operation (performed by user U i and the gateway node GW N with a computer system having windows 7 operating system, Intel (R) core (TM) 2 Quad CPU Q8300, @2.50 Hz processor, and 2 GB RAM) are listed in following Table 25. We assumed the time for executing a fuzzy extractor is the same as that for executing a hash function because the fuzzy extractor [27] can be constructed from universal hash functions or error-correcting codes requiring only lightweight operations.…”