Imprecision is pragmatic: Evidence from referential processing

Abstract

Gradable adjectives (GAs) provide an ideal domain for evaluating theories of the interface betwen semantic interpretation and context: relative and absolute GAs are both context dependent, but absolute adjectives can have precise meanings in a way that relative adjectives cannot. We provide processing evidence for the hypothesis that imprecision in absolute adjectives is a pragmatic phenomenon: absolute thresholds are semantically scalar endpoints, and imprecise uses are derived by a global pragmatic threshold, which specifies how much deviation from literal meaning is pragmatically ignorable in a context (see e.g. Lasersohn 1999). The evidence comes from a set of visual world eye-tracking experiments adapted from the design of Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers & Carlson (1999) and Aparicio, Xiang & Kennedy (2015). We measured the time-course of reference resolution in phrases of the form the Adj Noun while varying whether Adj is relative or absolute, as well as the degree to which the intended referent (target) and a competing object exemplified Adj. We found a contrast-based processing advantage for absolute GAs when the target exemplified Adj imprecisely but the competitor exemplified Adj precisely. However, this advantage was found to be sensitive to the relative/absolute distinction, as well as to the degree to which objects in the display exemplified the relevant scalar property. Collectively, our results provide evidence for a difference in the mental processes underlying relative versus absolute threshold fixing, which we argue is best modeled by a pragmatic theory of imprecision.

Learning Maximum Absolute Meaning Through Reasoning About Speaker Intentions

“…The maximum standard (i.e., maximum tightness of fit) seems to arise as learners evaluate possible meanings for a novel gradable adjective not only in a given, current context, but also across multiple contexts. This is broadly consistent with the proposal that imprecision associated with maximum standard absolute gradable adjective is pragmatic in nature (Aparicio, Xiang, & Kennedy, 2015; Kennedy, 2007; Leffel, Xiang, & Kennedy, 2016; Qing & Franke, 2014; Syrett et al., 2010). Unlike other types of adjectives that are semantically vague (e.g., A long rope can be arbitrarily long), maximum absolute gradable adjectives like full or straight are said to have a definitive, unique value specified in a context which is conveyed loosely according to pragmatic purposes at hand.…”

Vagueness in Implicature: The Case of Modified Adjectives

“…as in approximative readings of numerals), which introduces some flexibility into the interpretation (see especiallyKennedy 2007 andLasersohn 1999). The exact nature of non-endpoint thresholds in absolute adjectives is a theoretical debate that we do not wish to enter here (but seeLassiter & Goodman 2014;Qing & Franke 2014a;Aparicio et al 2016;Leffel et al 2016 for some recent studies).4 Contraction of negation (isn't versus is not) does not seem to make a difference, at least in our judgments. A broader and more important point is that these kinds of judgments are inherently gradient.…”

Incremental pragmatic interpretation of gradable adjectives: The role of standards of comparison

“…Aparicio et al suggest that this difference may result from the different lexical semantic properties of the adjective classes they tested: Relative adjectives (e.g., tall) need contextual support in order to fix the value of their threshold on the basis of a contextually salient comparison class. In particular, it seems that the Contrast object forms a comparison class with the Target object, on the basis of which the Target is classified as tall (see also Leffel et al 2016). On the contrary, this is not needed for minimum standard adjectives that have a fixed, context-invariant threshold, i.e., the minimum, endpoint value on the relevant measurement scale.…”