Impossibility theorems are modified and unified

Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar

doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0887-2

Soc Choice Welf

2015

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0887-2

|View full text |Cite

Impossibility theorems are modified and unified

Uuganbaatar Ninjbat

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2017

2019

Publication Types

Select...

Article4

Relationship

Self Cite1

Independent3

Authors

Journals

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In the case of a finite population, many works analyze Arrovian impossibility theorems: for example, seeIritani et al (2013),Man and Takayama (2013),Ninjbat (2015), andMuto and Sato (2016).3 To the best of our knowledge, I-strong Pareto is originally proposed bySakai (2006) under the name of "Strong Monotonicity for Infinite Generations",Crespo et al (2009) call it "infinite Pareto", and Lauwers (2010) calls it "intermediate Pareto". 4 This is proved byCato (2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population

Cato

2019

Soc Choice Welf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper considers the trade-off between unanimity and anonymity in collective decision-making with an infinite population. This efficiency-equity trade-off is a fundamental difficulty in making a normative judgment in a conflict between generations. In particular, it is known that this trade-off is quite sensitive in the formulation of unanimity axioms. In this study, we consider the trade-off in a preference-aggregation framework instead of the standard utility-aggregation framework. We show that there exists a social welfare function that satisfies I-strong Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and finite anonymity. This contrasts with an impossibility result in the standard utility-aggregation framework, and this means that the trade-off is also sensitive for background frameworks of aggregations.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population

Cato

2019

Soc Choice Welf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Impossibility theorems with countably many individuals

Ninjbat

2018

SERIEs

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The problem of social choice is studied on a domain with countably many individuals. In contrast to most of the existing literature which establish either non-constructive possibilities or approximate (i.e. invisible) dictators, we show that if one adds a continuity property to the usual set of axioms, the classical impossibilities persist in countable societies. Along the way, a new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in the style of Peter Fishburn's well known proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem is obtained.

show abstract

Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population

Cato

2017

Journal of Mathematical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

hi@scite.ai

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Impossibility theorems are modified and unified

Cited by 4 publications

References 27 publications

The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population

The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population

Impossibility theorems with countably many individuals

Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About