Implicit theories, attributions, and coping: A meaning system approach.

Abstract

This research sought to integrate C. S. Dweck and E. L. Leggett's (1988) model with attribution theory. Three studies tested the hypothesis that theories of intelligence-the belief that intelligence is malleable (incremental theory) versus fixed (entity theory)-would predict (and create) effort versus ability attributions, which would then mediate mastery-oriented coping. Study 1 revealed that, when given negative feedback, incremental theorists were more likely than entity theorists to attribute to effort. Studies 2 and 3 showed that incremental theorists were more likely than entity theorists to take remedial action if performance was unsatisfactory. Study 3, in which an entity or incremental theory was induced, showed that incremental theorists' remedial action was mediated by their effort attributions. These results suggest that implicit theories create the meaning framework in which attributions occur and are important for understanding motivation.Attributions have been widely recognized as mediators of adaptive and maladaptive behavior patterns in the face of setbacks. Weiner, for example has argued that attributions are the basis of achievement-motivation patterns, such as persistence versus nonpersistence following failure (Weiner, 1979(Weiner, , 1985Weiner & Kukla, 1970); Seligman and his colleagues have argued that an optimistic versus pessimistic attributional style forms the basis of adaptive versus maladapative patterns, including vulnerability to depression (Abramson,

Changing theories of change: Strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement.

“…These findings are highly consistent with the body of work demonstrating that implicit theories are sensitive to situational feedback, context and argument (Blackwell et al, 2007;Dweck, 2002;Hong et al, 1999;Molden et al, 2006;Murphy & Dweck, 2010;Plaks & Stecher, 2007. Unlike past Changing Theories of Change 46 research, however, we demonstrate that people alter their theories without any direct message priming or encouragement to take one perspective or the other: they appear to have access to both and can toggle toward one or the other as the situation demands.…”

“…Past research shows that implicit theories can quite readily be shifted by feedback, argument or intervention favoring one perspective (Good et al, 2012;Mueller & Dweck, 1998;Aronson, et al, 2002;Hong et al, 1999;Plaks & Stecher, 2007); Dweck and Leggett (1988) recognized the possibility that yet other situational factors might alter people's implicit beliefs.…”

Self-awareness, probability of improvement, and the self-serving bias.

“…Indeed, to take this position would be tantamount to proposing that incremental and entity theorists are simply people who, for whatever reason, have differing estimates of self and outcome efficacy, an interpretation that flies in the face of ancillary evidence collected by Dweck and her colleagues (e.g., Dweck et al, 1995;Hong et al, 1999) suggesting that the differing self-theories reflect distinct and complex cognitive frameworks and goal orientations. Nonetheless, our results can inform some of findings in the self-theories literature.…”

“…Lalwani and Duval (2000), for example, found that perceiving resources to be sufficient to deal with a potential problem (high self-efficacy) increases self-attribution of responsibility for coping with the problem. Other research found that causal attribution, at least to effort, mediates interest in activities designed to remedy failure (Hong et al, 1999).…”

Positive fantasies about idealized futures sap energy

“…Consider the past week (that is, the last 7 days)." Then, participants answered seven items indicative of their mastery of everyday challenges (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996;Dweck et al, 1995;Dweck & Leggett, 1988;Hong et al, 1999). The items were: "How well did the past week go for you?…”