Implications of Revenue Models and Technology for Content Moderation Strategies

Liu, Yi; Yıldırım, Pınar; Zhang, Z. John

doi:10.1287/mksc.2022.1361

Cited by 30 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Evidently, CLV and SLV are highly dependent on the platform’s revenue model(s) which are often more varied than in the traditional pipeline world. Revenues can be generated, for example, in the form of—or often also a combination of—transaction fees, subscription fees for consumers, access fees for suppliers, transaction fees and commissions, advertising by external parties, on-platform advertising by suppliers, or cross-sales of own products or services (Liu et al, 2022; Zhang et al, 2021).…”

Section: Consumer and Supplier Lifetime Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptualizing Value Creation in the Platform Era

Wichmann

Reinartz

Venkatesan

2022

Journal of Creating Value

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Platforms have entered many industries and increasingly dominate markets. As such, they increasingly displace the traditional linear pipeline model of value creation with a web of value-creating interactions among three key players: the platform provider, platform consumers and platform suppliers. Existing conceptualizations of consumer value, however, are still based in the linear pipeline world which raises the need to update these frameworks to the platform era. In this article, we make first important strides towards an overarching platform-based valuation framework which can be applied to any type of platform. We build upon Kumar et al. (2010) by applying and extending the concept of customer engagement value to the platform context. In doing so, we delineate a variety of value components that (a) originate from a platform’s consumers as well as suppliers, (b) generate monetary and non-monetary value for the platform provider, and (c) generate direct and indirect value for the platform provider. Together, these value components holistically capture platform participants’ value creation and assist managers in evaluating the health and sustainability of their platforms.

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Section: Consumer and Supplier Lifetime Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptualizing Value Creation in the Platform Era

Wichmann

Reinartz

Venkatesan

2022

Journal of Creating Value

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“…Our article contributes to the recently emerging literature on platform design that has studied the incentives of digital platforms on various key issues of governance as a gatekeeper. They include incentives to delist low‐quality sellers (Casner, 2020) or IP‐infringing sellers (Jeon et al., 2021), to curate apps (Etro, 2021), to introduce deceptive features (Johnen and Somogyi, 2021), to choose the intensity of seller competition (Johnson et al., 2021; Teh, 2022), and to moderate content (Liu et al., 2022; Madio and Quinn, 2021) among others. Our article is most closely related to Teh (2022) and Etro (2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Platform design biases in ad‐funded two‐sided markets

Choi

Jeon

2023

The RAND J of Economics

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We investigate how platform market power affects platforms' design choices in ad‐funded two‐sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider design choices affecting both sides in opposite ways and compare private incentives with social incentives. Platforms' design biases depend crucially on whether they can charge any price on the consumer side. We apply the framework to technology adoption, privacy, and ad load choices. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb market power of ad‐funded platforms with free services.

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“…We contribute to the literature on online platforms (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003;Rochet and Tirole, 2003) and, more specifically, to the literature on platform governance as we study a platform's policy to screen out IP-infringing sellers. Recent papers on platform governance have studied the incentives of digital platforms to choose the intensity of seller competition (Teh, 2022), to bias their innovations by trading off one side's surplus against that of the other side (Choi and Jeon, 2022), to introduce deceptive features (Johnen and Somogyi, 2021), to moderate content (Liu et al, 2022;Madio and Quinn, 2021), to delist low-quality sellers (Casner, 2020), and to ensure privacy protection (Etro, 2021a). 12 In addition, this paper is related to the literature on how platforms can influence seller innovation (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010;Jeon and Rey, 2022) and seller competition (Karle et al, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%