Implications of multilateral tariff bindings on the extent of preferential trade agreement formation

Tariff Bindings and the Dynamic Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements

“…Ultimately, multilateralism acts as a stumbling bloc to global free trade for Lake and Roy (2017). Unlike our paper, neither Lake and Roy (2017) nor Nken and Yildiz (2018) endogenize countries choice between FTAs and CUs and hence do not analyze the PTA building bloc and PTA stumbling bloc properties of FTAs and CUs.…”

“…In a repeated game setting, Freund (2000) shows how multilateral tari¤ liberalization can make an FTA "self-enforcing". Lake and Roy (2017) and Nken and Yildiz (2018) represent two recent contributions. Like our paper, Nken and Yildiz (2018) …nd tari¤ binding liberalization weakens the FTA nonmember free riding incentive.…”

“…Lake and Roy (2017) and Nken and Yildiz (2018) represent two recent contributions. Like our paper, Nken and Yildiz (2018) …nd tari¤ binding liberalization weakens the FTA nonmember free riding incentive. Hence, multilateral tari¤ liberalization again facilitates FTA expansion.…”

Dynamic preferential trade agreement formation and the role of political economy

“…16 We ignore multilateral cooperation and MFN tariff bindings, and assume that countries can impose optimal external tariffs under all trade regimes. Lake and Roy (2017), Lake et al (2020), andYildiz (2022) consider multilateral cooperation and implications of MFN tariff bindings on PTA formation explicitly. 17 Similar tariff structure applies to good IK (IJ) in country j (k).…”

“…Lake and Roy (2017), Lake et al. (2020), and Nken and Yildiz (2022) consider multilateral cooperation and implications of MFN tariff bindings on PTA formation explicitly.…”