Implications for psychology of the new philosophy of science.

Abstract

Polarities reflecting conflicts and tensions between approaches to psychology are attributed to an older, mistaken view of the nature of science. Salient features of a new philosophy of science that has developed over the past few decades are identified and their implications for psychology drawn. All science only approaches closure in the laboratory; outside of the laboratory, the world is radically open. Although scientific theory is equally valid in and out of the laboratory, it is not sufficient to explain behavior, nor is it easily applied. Neither natural nor social science has as its central role the explanation and prediction of individual behavior. Just as the application of physics requires engineering technology, explaining the behavior of particular individuals requires not only psychological theory but also situational, biographical, and historical information.

Desenvolvimento psicológico, mediação semiótica e representações sociais: por uma articulação teórica e metodológica

“…Em 1981, o mesmo Kock comparava o pesquisador a uma criança autista: alguém mais compelido na continuação e manutenção das fantasias da segurança metodológica, do que na importância de se alcançar um conhecimento signifi cativo. E mais: ele desafi ava o pesquisador a assumir que, na Psicologia , há objetos importantes a serem investigados, que talvez requeiram procedimentos outros, diferentes daqueles ditados pelas ciências naturais (Manicas & Secord, 1983).…”

“…Isso está presente, explícita ou implicitamente, em inúme-ras publicações entre as décadas de 1970 e 1990 -tanto nas revistas de psicologia, como nas de história da psicologia e nas de fi losofi a -nas quais são retomados diferentes autores do fi nal do século XIX e início do século XX (Ash, 1992;Braun & Baribeau, 1985;Farr, 1981;Hilgard, 1980a;Hilgard, 1980b;Kimble, 1984;Koch, 1981;Manicas & Secord, 1983;Rogoff & Chavajay, 1995;Wartofsky, 1982).…”

Philosophical commitments, empirical evidence, and theoretical psychology

“…Our concerns with the characterization of philosophical/theoretical commitments as nonempirical, outside the bounds of methodological consideration, and/or nonrational is further illustrated by analogy with problematic appeals to Kuhn's work found in some influential essays in theoretical psychology (e.g., Gergen, 1985;Manicas & Secord, 1983).…”

“…We argue that this characterization is incoherent. We illustrate our concern by analogy with problematic appeals to Kuhn's work that have been influential in theoretical psychology (e.g., Gergen, 1985;Manicas & Secord, 1983).…”

Doing Good Science without Sacrificing Good Values: Why the Heuristic Paradigm is the Best Choice for Social Work

“…These authors first thoroughly and systematically misrepresent and dismiss the heuristic paradigm. Then, they recommend fallible realism as if it were in opposition to the heuristic paradigm, when in fact fallible realism was originally imported into social work by Heineman Pieper (1981 as part of the heuristic paradigm, and two papers elucidating this perspective were reprinted as foundations for the heuristic paradigm in Tyson's (1995) textbook (one by Bhaskar [1989] who calls it "transcendental" or "critical" realism [1975,1991], and the paper by Manicas & Secord [1983] to which Anastas & MacDonald [1994], Anastas [1999], and Bolland & Atherton refer). After claiming the heuristic paradigm opposes a "straw man" and that the legacy of logical empiricism is "dead" in social work (Bolland & Atherton, this issue), these authors proceed to recommend logical empiricist concepts in their proposed frameworks for social work research (for example, Popper's ideas for research design and theory-testing, see below).…”