Implementing adaptive risk management for synthetic biology: Lessons from iGEM's safety and security programme

Millett, Piers; Alexanian, Tessa

doi:10.1049/enb2.12012

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Studies that model terrorist scenarios are available, which might assist bad actors in predicting the impact of attacks. It is difficult to identify and anticipate all concerning research areas and formal regulation cannot keep pace [74]. It is therefore important to consider the possibility of research misuse when developing and implementing new open science tools and initiatives for general use.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In certain high-risk fields, platforms could request that details of hazard assessment be provided, which could be incentivised by journals requesting evidence of such assessments on publication. A safety and security form is required as part of the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition [74], which may be a useful model. In cases where researchers are unsure or do have concerns, they could be directed to an expert or relevant resources.…”

Section: Preregistration: An Opportunity For Dual-use Oversightmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Open science practices and risks arising from misuse of biological research

Smith¹,

Sandbrink²

2021

Preprint

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The proliferation of open science may inadvertently increase the chance of deliberate or accidental misuse of research. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. We argue that open data, code, and materials may increase risks from research with misuse potential, despite their general importance. For instance, increased access to protocols, datasets, and computational methods for viral engineering may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. The increased use of preprints could challenge any strategy for risk mitigation that relies on assessment at the publication stage, emphasising the need for earlier oversight in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Preregistration: An Opportunity For Dual-use Oversightmentioning

confidence: 99%

Open science practices and risks arising from misuse of biological research

Smith¹,

Sandbrink²

2021

Preprint

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“…The International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) synthetic biology competition can also serve as an example of a testbed for providing incentives for engagement with safety and security and encouraging interdisciplinary collaboration. 141 …”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivating Proactive Biorisk Management

2023

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Scholars and practitioners of biosafety and biosecurity (collectively, biorisk management or BRM) have argued that life scientists should play a more proactive role in monitoring their work for potential risks, mitigating harm, and seeking help as necessary. However, most efforts to promote proactive BRM have focused on training life scientists in technical skills and have largely ignored the extent to which life scientists wish to use them (ie, their motivation). In this article, we argue that efforts to promote proactive BRM would benefit from a greater focus on life scientists' motivation. We review relevant literature on life scientists' motivation to practice BRM, offer examples of successful interventions from adjacent fields, and outline ideas for possible interventions to promote proactive BRM, along with strategies for iterative development, testing, and scaling.

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“…In certain high-risk fields, platforms could request that details of hazard assessment be provided, which could be incentivised by journals requesting evidence of such assessments on publication. A safety and security form is required as part of the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition [ 78 ], which may be a useful model. In cases where researchers are unsure or do have concerns, they could be directed to an expert or relevant resources.…”

Section: Preregistration: An Opportunity For Dual-use Oversightmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies that model terrorist scenarios are available, which might assist bad actors in predicting the impact of attacks. It is difficult to identify and anticipate all concerning research areas and formal regulation cannot keep pace [ 78 ]. It is therefore important to consider the possibility of research misuse when developing and implementing new open science tools and initiatives for general use.…”

Section: The Way Forwardmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biosecurity in an age of open science

Smith

Sandbrink

2022

PLoS Biol

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The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

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Implementing adaptive risk management for synthetic biology: Lessons from iGEM's safety and security programme

Cited by 6 publications

References 5 publications

Open science practices and risks arising from misuse of biological research

Open science practices and risks arising from misuse of biological research

Motivating Proactive Biorisk Management

Biosecurity in an age of open science

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