Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism

Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations

“…The most commonly used equilibrium principles that result in Pareto optimal allocations are the Walrasian equilibrium, proportional equilibrium and Lindahl distributive equilibrium solutions for private goods economies, Lindahl equilibrium, ratio equilibrium and cost share equilibrium solutions for public goods economies. Many specific mechanisms have been provided in the literature that implement theseequilibrium principles such as those in Hurwicz (1979); Schmeidler (1980); Hurwicz et al (1995); Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989); Tian (1989Tian ( , 1994Tian ( , 1996Tian ( , 2003; Hong (1995); Peleg (1996a, b); Suh (1995Suh ( , 1997; Yoshihara (1999); Duggan (2003) among others. The implementation literature rarely discusses implementation of the whole set of Pareto efficient allocations under private ownership or more generally under other ownership structures.…”

Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale

“…Until recently, most studies have been largely devoted to pure exchange models or economies with convex production possibility sets such as those in Hurwicz (1979), Schmeidler (1980), Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1995), Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989), Tian (1989Tian ( , 1992Tian ( , 1996Tian ( , 1999, Hong (1995), and Peleg (1996), Suh (1995), Yoshihara, (1999), Duggan (2003), among others. Recently, Tian (2009a) considered the problem of the incentive mechanism design for economies with non-convexities in production technologies.…”

A solution to the problem of consumption externalities

“…When a consumer's level of preference depends in part on the consumption of others, not every Walrasian equilibrium is necessarily Pareto optimal, and thus one needs to adopt other types of resource allocation principles. The problem of designing incentive-compatible mechanisms over classes of economies displaying externalities has been investigated in the literature mainly in the spacial case wherein the externalities arise out of the provision of public goods such as those in Hurwicz (1979), Hurwicz et al (1995), Walker (1977), Tian (1989Tian ( , 1990Tian ( , 2000b, and Li et al (1995).…”