Implementation and Testing of OSNMA for Galileo

Sarto, Carlo; Pozzobon, Oscar; Fantinato, Samuel; Montagner, Stefano; Fernández‐Hernández, Ignacio; Simón, Javier; Calle, J. David; Díaz, Simon Cancela; Walker, Paul Andreas; Burkey, Daniel D.; Seco‐Granados, Gonzalo; Göhler, E.

doi:10.33012/2017.15184

Cited by 14 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…In the implementation of OSNMA, Margaria et al (2016) demonstrated the OSNMA in both a commercial GPS receiver and a modified software receiver. Sarto et al (2017) reported the implementation and testing progress of OSNMA for Galileo till 2017. Motella et al (2020) proposed a real-time OSNMA-ready software receiver that includes a detailed set-up and running demonstration.…”

Section: Open Service Navigation Message Authentication For Galileomentioning

confidence: 99%

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

Yuan

Tang

2023

Satell Navig

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Civilian services of Global Navigation Satellite System are threatened by spoofing attacks since it is hard to determine the authenticity of a navigation signal with a detailed structure open to the public. Signal authentication effectively protects the security of the signal by attaching unforgeable information to one or several elements of the signal. Receivers can verify the authenticity of the signal by extracting and validating this information. Developing good signal authentication schemes requires understanding possible spoofing modes, signal element specialty, and performance evaluation methods. This paper is an overview of navigation signal authentication, where the theories and reported approaches are described in detail. A design/performance matrix that demonstrates the advantages and defects of the signal element and its authentication design is summarized. Recommendations are proposed to improve the robustness, security, efficiency, and implementation hardness for future designs of navigation signal authentication.

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Section: Open Service Navigation Message Authentication For Galileomentioning

confidence: 99%

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

Yuan

Tang

2023

Satell Navig

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“…The performance of the proposed RFC-SPA scheme is compared with the Chimera in GPS [13] and OSNMA in Galileo [17], which are two mainstream authentication schemes under construction for the implementation. The performance of these two schemes has been assessed in the previous works [13,27,28]. The results of these previous assessments are regarded as the performance of the Chimera and the OSNMA.…”

Section: Performance Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Randomly Flipped Chip based signal power authentication for GNSS civilian signals

Yuan

Tang

Sun

et al. 2022

IET Radar Sonar & Navi

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The navigation signal authentication schemes protect GNSS services from spoofing attacks by attaching unforgeable information to signals. In this study, Randomly Flipped Chip based Signal Power Authentication (RFC‐SPA), is proposed to jointly authenticate the navigation message and spreading code of GNSS civilian signals. Designed to support two modes of authentication (fast channel and slow channel), the proposed scheme employs a fixed amount of flipped chips, which are randomly distributed in some areas of the spreading code to form a relative fluctuation in the correlation result of the signal. The fast channel is a spreading code authentication (SCA) of these flipped chips, which is the same as the Chimera. In the slow channel, since the correlation results between the local periodical spreading code and the signal in areas with flipped chips will be smaller than those results in areas without flipped chips, receivers in the tracking correlation can extract this fluctuation. Since the fluctuation modulates a digital signature, receivers can verify the authenticity of both the navigation message and spreading code through the authentication of this digital signature. Compared with mainstream schemes, RFC‐SPA requires no extra tracking channel and has no impact on the navigation message. Besides, the proposed scheme maintains a similar robustness and security performance while significantly reducing the storage requirement compared with SCA. The scheme is demonstrated in a proposed implementation for Beidou B1C civilian signal, and the performance metrics are analysed. In the proposed implementation, the detection possibility is higher than 99.7% at 35dBHz of C/N0, and only 33.6% of the storage is required compared with the suggested configuration of the Chimera scheme for the GPS L1C civilian signal.

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“…The expected number of starting points to be checked before finding a good key is inversely proportional to p, i.e., 1/p. Given ̂ the hashing time in seconds by the adversary, it takes ℓ ̂ seconds to generate a chain of ℓ keys, and it is expected to take 2 ℓ + 1 ℓ ̂= 2  ̂ℓ ℓ + 1 (12) seconds to test enough starting points to find a spoofed chain of length ℓ. Note that when ℓ = 1, then ℓ/(ℓ+1) = 0.5, and when ℓ is large enough ℓ/(ℓ + 1)  1.…”

Section: E the Online Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, the popular GPS L1 C/A transmits every bit over a period of 20ms, resulting in a throughput of 50-bit/second; for Galileo E1 these numbers are respectively 4ms and 250-symbols/second, encoding bits with a ½ coding rate. The academic literature contains a plenitude of proposals for radionavigation authentication protocols [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]. The standard approach is to adopt and adapt cryptographic protocols from other domains, e.g., network communications.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis and Recommendations for MAC and Key Lengths in Delayed Disclosure GNSS Authentication Protocols

Fernández‐Hernández

Ashur

Rijmen

2021

IEEE Trans. Aerosp. Electron. Syst.

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Data and signal authentication schemes are being proposed to address Global Navigation Satellite Systems' (GNSS) vulnerability to spoofing. Due to the low power of their signals, the bandwidth available for authentication in GNSS is scarce. Since delayed-disclosure protocols, e.g., TESLA, are efficient in terms of bandwidth and robust to signal impairments, they have been proposed and implemented by GNSS. The length of message authentication codes (MACs) and cryptographic keys are two crucial aspects of the protocol design as they have an impact on the utilized bandwidth, and therefore on the protocol performance. We analyze both aspects in detail for GNSS-TESLA and present recommendations for efficient yet safe MAC and key lengths. We further complement this analysis by proposing possible authentication success and failure policies and quantify the reduction of the attack surface resulting from employing them. The analysis shows that in some cases it is safe to use MAC and key sizes that are smaller than those proposed in best-practice guidelines. While some of our considerations are general to delayed-disclosure lightweight protocols for data and signal authentication, we particularize them for GNSS-TESLA protocols.

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Implementation and Testing of OSNMA for Galileo

Cited by 14 publications

References 5 publications

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

Randomly Flipped Chip based signal power authentication for GNSS civilian signals

Analysis and Recommendations for MAC and Key Lengths in Delayed Disclosure GNSS Authentication Protocols

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