Impenetrability of visual perception: Implications for aesthetic analysis

Abstract

Several very recent examples are critically discussed of philosophical aestheticians using psychological data allegedly showing the cognitive penetration of visual perception in order to build arguments on major issues in aesthetics: How art expertise functions (Stokes, 2014); the (in)validity of an important aspect of Arthur Danto?s theory that is based on his ?gallery of indiscernibles? (Nanay, 2015); and the claim of ?automatic? emotional impact of paintings (Bullot & Reber, 2013). The present critique of these aestheticians? theoretical endeavors is based largely on the recent analysis by Firestone and Scholl (2016) - sweeping, but most likely justified - to the effect that visual perception is encapsulated and that cognition does not affect visual perception. Additional theoretical and empirical support for the critique is derived from a nonemotivist theory of the effect of paintings (Konecni, 2015a).