Impacts of knowledge spillovers and cartelization on cooperative innovation decisions with uncertain technology efficiency

Zhou, Xuejun; Yang, Shanxue; Wang, Guoli

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2020.106395

Cited by 33 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Wu et al (2021) showed that although brand spillover can improve the attractiveness of products of weak brand companies for free, weak brand companies should not use brand spillover effects if their original brand power is low enough or the contract manufacturer does not have a significant cost advantage. Su et al (2023) and Zhou et al (2020) studied the impact of knowledge spillover on partners and innovation decisions. Shapiro (2017) investigated the consequences of positive spillovers on the advertising decisions made by companies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A comparative analysis of channel strategies for refurbished products: The influence of blockchain, brand spillover on co‐opetitive supply chain

Fang,

Bai

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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Industry insiders and researchers have widely recognized refurbishment as an environmentally friendly activity that reduces raw material waste and energy consumption. Simultaneously, blockchain is increasingly used in the supply chain with its information transparency and traceability. The refurbished product market possesses substantial potential. Nevertheless, refurbished products carry an inherent risk of brand spillover. Within this framework, manufacturers must weigh broader considerations in selecting product distribution channels. In this study, we discuss three sales models for new and refurbished products in the secondary market, namely, Scenarios M (where the manufacturer sells new products to consumers through the retailer and sells refurbished products to consumers directly), R (where the manufacturer sells new products to consumers through the retailer, and the retailer produces and sells refurbished products alongside new products), and C (where the manufacturer sells new products to consumers, and the remanufacturer sells refurbished products to consumers through a retailer). Upon examining the equilibrium outcomes of each model, it is evident that a manufacturer's decision to produce refurbished products hinges on market demand. High demand for refurbished goods inclines manufacturers towards the M scenario, whereas insufficient demand leads to cessation of refurbishment activities. Conversely, retailers navigate between R and C scenarios based on market demand. The advent of blockchain technology shifts the strategic focus: the extent of brand spillover supersedes market demand as the pivotal factor influencing retailers' production strategies. Blockchain technology can increase manufacturers' profits. Interestingly, in Scenario C, blockchain does not always improve retailer profits.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A comparative analysis of channel strategies for refurbished products: The influence of blockchain, brand spillover on co‐opetitive supply chain

Fang,

Bai

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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“…In this study, let e be the digital investment level for planting agricultural products; it mainly refers to the degree to which agriculture adopts digital technology for planting. Following some previous studies, such as Niu et al (2016) and Zhou et al (2020), we assume that the cost of digital investment is

\frac{1}{2} β e^{2}

, where

β > 0

is the cost coefficient of digital investment. At this time, the total yield of agricultural products is

((), x + italicαe) q

, where

α > 0

represents the sensitivity coefficient of digital investment to output.…”

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital technology adoption strategies for a contract farming supply chain under CVaR criterion

Liao,

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This study considers a contract farming supply chain consisting of a platform and a risk‐averse farmer with yield uncertainty. It establishes game theory models with and without digital technology under CVaR criterion and analyzes three digital cooperation mechanisms. We find that when the wholesale price is moderate, both parties will choose a cost‐sharing contract; when the wholesale price is high, both parties will choose to let the farmer bear the cost of digital investment; when the farmer uses digital technology to grow agricultural products, the platform should not provide the farmer with a low wholesale price, especially for the farmer with low risk aversion.

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“…Recently, Nouri et al Ref [13] investigated the coordination of a manufacturer's innovation and a retailer's promotion, as well as replenishment in a manufacturer-retailer chain with a compensation-based wholesale price contract. The optimal cooperative innovation decision with uncertain technology efficiency was investigated in Ref [14], and the impacts of knowledge spillovers and cartelization on cooperative innovation decisions were analyzed. In terms of joint innovation investment and production decisions, the joint product innovation and production decisions under quality authorization were studied in Ref [15].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

Meng

2021

Sustainability

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In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

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Impacts of knowledge spillovers and cartelization on cooperative innovation decisions with uncertain technology efficiency

Cited by 33 publications

References 24 publications

A comparative analysis of channel strategies for refurbished products: The influence of blockchain, brand spillover on co‐opetitive supply chain

A comparative analysis of channel strategies for refurbished products: The influence of blockchain, brand spillover on co‐opetitive supply chain

Digital technology adoption strategies for a contract farming supply chain under CVaR criterion

Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

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