Impact of state ownership as political capital on the technological innovation of private sector enterprises: evidence from China

Does global value chain position affect innovation performance of China’s high-tech industries?

“…To test our hypotheses, following the previous studies (Hou et al , 2019; Yu et al , 2020), we use ordinary least squares regression models to examine the effect of GVC position and its interaction effects with specialization agglomeration and diversification agglomeration on innovation performance of China’s high-tech industries. To test H1 , we first set up a basic panel model to test the effect of GVC position on innovation performance of China’s high-tech industries as follows: where INN , RDI , SIZE , EXP , INF , HC and POS represent innovation performance, R&D expenditures, industry size, industry export, information level and human capital and GVC position respectively.…”

Do government subsidies and financing constraints play a dominant role in the effect of state ownership on corporate innovation? Evidence from China

“…First, unlike SOEs, firms with moderate non‐state ownership can pursue economic profit maximisation without undertaking excessive political goals, which reduces firms' risk aversion and increases their innovation willingness (Pan et al, 2020). Second, unlike fully private firms, firms with moderate state ownership can obtain more innovation resources through government support and enhance their innovation abilities (Groves et al, 1994; Musacchio et al, 2015; Yu et al, 2020). Third, the higher the equity mix of a firm, the stronger the checks and balances between state‐owned and non‐state‐owned shareholders, which is conducive to reducing corporate principal–agent costs, optimising the corporate governance structure and providing an excellent internal environment for corporate innovation (Inoue et al, 2013; Zhang et al, 2020).…”

Government subsidies of new energy vehicle industry and enterprise innovation: Moderating role of chief executive officers' technical background

“…They are not “professional managers” in the general sense but “quasi‐government officials” who work in the enterprise. They are more concerned about their career advancement, more inclined to avoid high‐risk and long‐term R&D projects, and prefer to cautiously improve corporate competitiveness and performance (Yu et al, 2020). Meanwhile, private enterprise executives do not have such political considerations, and they pay more attention to the long‐term competitiveness and profit maximization of firms (Yu et al, 2020).…”

“…They are more concerned about their career advancement, more inclined to avoid high‐risk and long‐term R&D projects, and prefer to cautiously improve corporate competitiveness and performance (Yu et al, 2020). Meanwhile, private enterprise executives do not have such political considerations, and they pay more attention to the long‐term competitiveness and profit maximization of firms (Yu et al, 2020). Therefore, with the same technical background, the CEOs' innovation motivation and talents can be more fully utilized in private enterprises.…”