Impact of Roles Assignation on Heterogeneous Populations in Evolutionary Dictator Game

Abstract

The evolution of cooperation is a hot and challenging topic in the field of evolutionary game theory. Altruistic behavior, as a particular form of cooperation, has been widely studied by the ultimatum game but not by the dictator game, which provides a more elegant way to identify the altruistic component of behaviors. In this paper, the evolutionary dictator game is applied to model the real motivations of altruism. A degree-based regime is utilized to assess the impact of the assignation of roles on evolutionary outcome in populations of heterogeneous structure with two kinds of strategic updating mechanisms, which are based on Darwin's theory of evolution and punctuated equilibrium, respectively. The results show that the evolutionary outcome is affected by the role assignation and that this impact also depends on the strategic updating mechanisms, the function used to evaluate players' success, and the structure of populations.

The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives

“…Finally, it is well known that human populations are in general highly structured, where different individuals interact with different subsets of the entire population. Theoretical studies that are based on evolutionary game methods have indicated that structures play a major role in the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games, such as prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and PGG 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 . However, cooperative outcomes have been rarely observed in experiments on many static networks 56 57 58 59 60 .…”

Eliciting Fairness in N‐Player Network Games through Degree‐Based Role Assignment

“…e authors show that attributing the role of Proposer to high-degree nodes leads to unfair scenarios [23]. Likewise, Deng et al studied the role assignment based on degree, concluding that the effect of degree-based role assignment depends on the mechanism of strategy update [24]. When considering a pairwise comparison based on accumulated payoffs and social learning (as we do in the present work), the levels of contribution in the population increase if lowerdegree individuals have a higher probability of being the Dictators.…”

Quantum games of opinion formation based on the Marinatto-Weber quantum game scheme

“…Now, let us investigate the GM III whose payoff matrix is given as (3). By using the generalized MW scheme as shown in (12) - (16), the expected payoff functions$ A (p, p 1 , q, q 1 ) and$ B (p, p 1 , q, q 1 ) can be derived. Here, our attention has mainly been paid on the joint payoff of$ A (p, p 1 , q, q 1 )+$ B (p, p 1 , q, q 1 ), which is given as below:…”

“…Many models, such as DeGroot model [4], Sznajd model [5], discrete CODA model [6], Hegselmann-Krause model [7], generalized Glauber models [8], Deffuant model [9], have been developed to simulate interaction mechanisms of opinions. In recent years, game theory, which provides a useful framework to build foundational models to mimick the interactions among agents with conflict of interests in many disciplines [10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19], has also been used in these fields to help understand opinion formation and evolution. With respect to opinion formation, a lot of game models have been proposed or used in previous studies [20][21][22][23][24][25].…”