Impact of reverse channel competition, individual rationality, and information asymmetry on multi-channel closed-loop supply chain design

Suvadarshini, Pinakhi; Biswas, Indranil; Srivastava, Samir K.

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2023.108818

Cited by 18 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…In this dynamic game, they derive the most pricing and production decisions of the manufacturer and supplier, and the results show that the manufacturer/supplier prefers to be followers rather than the first to participate in recycling activities. Suvadarshini et al (2023) consider the multi-channel recall structure of the OEM. They analyze three different return channel structures and information asymmetries under the simultaneous influence of competition, collection efficiency, and individual rationality.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling investment strategies in two‐sided competition with diverse vertical structures

Liu,

Li,

Zhang

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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The supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a downstream retailer encounters vertical competition along with two‐sided competition from a third party remanufacturer (3PR). The two‐sided competition refers to competition in both recycling and sales. We investigate the recycling investments by the OEM and retailer in diverse vertical structures. Our findings indicate that cooperative investment is optimal when either the OEM or retailer is the Stackelberg leader, but neither party is willing to invest in recycling when they are in vertical Nash. The experiments reveal that the OEM, acting as the Stackelberg leader, and implementing the cooperative investment strategy, yields better economic and environmental benefits.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling investment strategies in two‐sided competition with diverse vertical structures

Liu,

Li,

Zhang

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Giri and Dey (2019) addressed decision-making issues involving manufacturer-built recycling channels and traditional competition among recyclers [23] , while Wei et al (2019) analyzed the remanufacturer's decision-making in the context of dual recycling channels [24] . Zhou et al (2023) investigated channel leadership and performance in a closed-loop supply chain that involves the competition among an electric vehicle manufacturer, an electric vehicle recycler, and a third-party recycler [25] . Suvadarshini et al (2023) studied a closed-loop supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a retailer and a third-party vendor where the OEM designs an efficient multi-channel recollection structure when recollection agents competitively recollect used products [26] .…”

Section: Research Related To Competition In or Between Closed-loop Su...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zhou et al (2023) investigated channel leadership and performance in a closed-loop supply chain that involves the competition among an electric vehicle manufacturer, an electric vehicle recycler, and a third-party recycler [25] . Suvadarshini et al (2023) studied a closed-loop supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a retailer and a third-party vendor where the OEM designs an efficient multi-channel recollection structure when recollection agents competitively recollect used products [26] .…”

Section: Research Related To Competition In or Between Closed-loop Su...mentioning

confidence: 99%

A decision-making model for echelon utilization of retired batteries in competitive duopoly: the role of government subsidy

Zhao,

Wang,

2024

Green Manuf Open

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As the wave of retirements in the new energy vehicle sector approaches, China’s emphasis on echelon utilization has grown to optimize battery reuse and recycling. However, the burgeoning industry will inevitably face the challenges of competition, influencing stakeholders across the supply chain. In this study, we employ game theoretic models to investigate the interplay between competitive dynamics and government subsidy policies within this industry. Through the development of a competitive duopoly echelon utilization supply chain model, our analysis offers valuable insights and recommendations for the advancement of the industry. We find that increases in echelon utilization costs prompt adjustments in retail prices by echelon utilization enterprises, third-party recyclers, and new energy vehicle manufacturers. As competition intensifies, overall supply chain profitability diminishes, resulting in a lose-lose situation, favoring only third-party recyclers, who raise wholesale prices as new energy vehicle manufacturers reduce transfer payments. Conversely, government subsidies stimulate higher total demand, benefiting subsidized echelon utilization enterprises, which enhance consumer and social value. Non-subsidized enterprises are compelled to raise retail prices. Given the positive impact of subsidies, governments should prioritize support for enterprises demonstrating superior echelon utilization practices.

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“…Remanufacturers collect qualified used products from consumers [23], and the recycling channel of second-hand products is the key issue for remanufacturers to make decisions [24]. A multi-channel recycling strategy can significantly improve recycling efficiency [25], and remanufacturing through manufacturers' channels or third-party channels is a common recycling channel [26]. The influencing factors of recycling channel selection for remanufacturers include the recycling cost [27], consumer preferences for remanufactured goods [28], channel competition [29] and channel cooperation [30], environmental impact [31], recovery price [32], etc.…”

Section: Recycling Channels Of the Reverse Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Pricing and Government Subsidy Strategy for End-of-Life Vehicles in a Reverse Supply Chain under Consumer Recycling Channel Preferences

Wang

2023

Mathematics

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In the existing recycling system for end-of-life vehicles (ELVs), online recycling based on the Internet platform is a useful supplement. In this paper, a Stackelberg game pricing model, which is dominated by ELV part remanufacturers and composed of remanufacturers, recyclers, and consumers, is constructed considering consumer preferences for recycling channels. The influence of different subsidy strategies on the optimal pricing, profit, and recycling volume of the reverse supply chain (RSC) of ELVs is discussed, and the effects of factors such as subsidy amount and consumer preferences on the RSC of ELVs are analyzed using numerical simulation. The results show that the increase in consumers’ online recycling preferences has a positive effect on the recycling volume and profit of the RSC of ELVs. Considering the recycling volume of the RSC, when fewer subsidies are given, more recycling volume can be generated by subsidizing remanufacturers, and, on the contrary, recycling volume will be generated by subsidizing consumers. Considering the profit of the RSC, when subsidies are given at the lower-middle level, higher profits can be earned by subsidizing remanufacturers, and, on the contrary, higher profits can be earned by subsidizing consumers.

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Impact of reverse channel competition, individual rationality, and information asymmetry on multi-channel closed-loop supply chain design

Cited by 18 publications

References 43 publications

Recycling investment strategies in two‐sided competition with diverse vertical structures

Recycling investment strategies in two‐sided competition with diverse vertical structures

A decision-making model for echelon utilization of retired batteries in competitive duopoly: the role of government subsidy

Recycling Pricing and Government Subsidy Strategy for End-of-Life Vehicles in a Reverse Supply Chain under Consumer Recycling Channel Preferences

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