Impact of financing models and carbon allowance allocation rules in a supply chain

Wang, Minxue; Zhao, Ruiqing

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126794

Cited by 16 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 61 publications

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“…In terms of low-carbon remanufacturing of products, Chang et al (2017) found that benchmarking rule provides more incentives for manufacturers to use low-carbon remanufacturing of products. In terms of the supply chain, benchmarking rule can promote more emissions reductions than grandfathering (Wang et al, 2021). In terms of technological investment, Yang et al (2020) argued that firms make more investments in clean technology under the benchmarking rule but reduce more emissions under the grandfathering rule.…”

Section: Carbon Allowance Allocation Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon allowance allocation rules under emission intensity regulation: Grandfathering versus benchmarking

Sun

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper compares the impacts of grandfathering and benchmarking rules on firms' operating decisions, consumer surplus, and social welfare with different emission intensity limits. The findings suggest that with tight emission intensity limits, grandfathering rules are more effective in controlling carbon emissions and enhancing social welfare. Benchmarking rule with relaxed emission intensity can incentivize firms to increase output, lower product prices, and increase consumer surplus. Under relaxed intensity regulation, grandfathering rule can encourage more potential entrants to participate in the product market, and benchmarking rule can motivate firms to take more outputs, resulting higher consumer surplus and more carbon emissions.

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Section: Carbon Allowance Allocation Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon allowance allocation rules under emission intensity regulation: Grandfathering versus benchmarking

Sun

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Game theory is often used by researchers to build and solve models in the supply chain management area. In the field of supply chain financing, game theory is also widely used [16][17][18]. Yan et al [19] established a two-stage Stackelberg game model consisting of the retailer, the manufacturer and the bank, and analyzed the interdependence between the business decisions and financial decisions of the retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ Accounts-Receivable Pledge Financing in the Supply Chain

Tian

et al. 2022

Systems

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Due to limited guarantees, it is difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to obtain loans from banks. Supply chain accounts-receivable pledge financing (SCARPF) can help in overcoming those financing difficulties. This study developed an evolutionary game model of banks, core enterprises and SMEs in SCARPF, analyzed the evolution path and evolution rules of the model, and performed a numerical simulation. The results indicated that the result of the evolutionary game depends on the initial values of the variables. When certain conditions are met, the system will evolve to (lending, keep the contract). The higher the return rate during either normal production of SMEs, the loan interest rate or supply chain punishment, the more likely it is that banks will lend money and SMEs will keep the contract. However, the bank will only be likely to lend money, enabling SMEs to keep the contract, when the probability of core enterprises and SMEs engaging in joint loan fraud—or the proportion of the benefits that SMEs share when engaging in joint loan fraud—is reduced. The results of this study provide insights for banks, core enterprises, and SMEs in supply chain financing decisions, which is conducive to solving the financing difficulties of SMEs.

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“… 22 Under the Benchmarking, quota benchmark value is based on the industry’s benchmark carbon emissions, according to the industry’s technical level, emission reduction potential, emission control objectives and other comprehensive factors. 23 This method is fairer but may not accurately reflect diverse industry standards due to limited data and imperfect calculations, making it more suitable for industries with a single type of energy product. 24 Related research shows that multilateral cooperation can promote effectiveness in global energy governance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping carbon reduction: A cross-continental study of alliance strategies

Zhou,

Xiang,

Zhu

et al. 2024

iScience

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Impact of financing models and carbon allowance allocation rules in a supply chain

Cited by 16 publications

References 61 publications

Carbon allowance allocation rules under emission intensity regulation: Grandfathering versus benchmarking

Carbon allowance allocation rules under emission intensity regulation: Grandfathering versus benchmarking

Evolutionary Game of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ Accounts-Receivable Pledge Financing in the Supply Chain

Mapping carbon reduction: A cross-continental study of alliance strategies

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