Impact analysis of SBAS authentication

Abstract

The GNSS community is dedicating significant effort to protect applications from harmful interference, including spoofing. As part of this effort, Europe will authenticate the Galileo Open Service message and is currently evaluating authentication schemes for EGNOS. This article presents the main results of recent EU activities on EGNOS authentication. After presenting some examples that illustrate the importance of authenticating SBAS, this article describes the main drivers for SBAS authentication design, namely, the use of I and/or Q channels, the use of the L1 and/or L5 frequencies, the authentication latency, and the cryptographic parameters. Later, the article presents the performances of EC‐Schnorr and TESLA data authentication schemes and analyzes their impact in the SBAS L1 message sequence and in the L1/L5 Dual Frequency Multi‐Constellation Standard message sequence, currently under development.

Design and Analysis of a Public Key Infrastructure for SBAS Data Authentication

“…There are several curves that have been standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [11] with their public key, private key, and signature sizes shown in Table 1. EC-Schnorr is another elliptic curve authentication scheme that has smaller signature sizes than ECDSA and has been discussed as a possible candidate for authentication [9], but as it has not yet been standardized, this work will consider ECDSA. Compared with TESLA, ECDSA has a longer signature and public key length for an equivalent security level.…”

“…This is known as the practice of key management (KM) of a public key infrastructure (PKI) and a well-designed PKI should function without causing an interruption to the SBAS service. Several publications have called for the design of a KM architecture tailored to the needs of GNSS authentication [1]- [9] and one publication has offered a potential solution [10]. This solution was designed for Galileo's open service navigation message authentication (NMA) service and utilizes other networks/resources to carry out KM.…”

Towards a Cyber Secure Shipboard Radar

“…Remarkable advances in computer technology over the last two decades have also influenced radar development, resulting in complex software-based systems. With the increasing reliance on digitalisation, software development and network integration – not only of radar but other shipboard navigational equipment – the need to safeguard shipping from cyber threats has acquired great importance (Lee et al, 2017; Fernández-Hernández et al, 2018; Hareide et al, 2018; Lewis et al, 2018; Polatid et al, 2018; Shapiro et al, 2018; Svilicic et al, 2019; Tam and Jones, 2019).…”

Design and analysis of a public key infrastructure for SBAS data authentication

“…This is known as the practice of key management (KM) of a public key infrastructure (PKI) and a well‐designed PKI should function without causing an interruption to the SBAS service. Several publications have called for the design of a KM architecture tailored to the needs of GNSS authentication and one publication has offered a potential solution . This solution was designed for Galileo's open service navigation message authentication (NMA) service and utilizes other networks/resources to carry out KM.…”

“…There are several curves that have been standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with their security level, public key length, and signature length shown in Table . EC‐Schnorr is another elliptic curve authentication scheme that has smaller signature sizes to ECDSA and has been discussed as a possible candidate for authentication, but as it has not yet been standardized, this work will consider ECDSA.…”