Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2000
DOI: 10.1145/352871.352889
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Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior

Abstract: Reputation reporting systems have emerged as an important risk management mechanism in online trading communities. However, the predictive value of these systems can be compromised in situations where conspiring buyers intentionally give unfair ratings to sellers or, where sellers discriminate on the quality of service they provide to different buyers. This paper proposes and evaluates a set of mechanisms, which eliminate, or significantly reduce the negative effects of such fraudulent behavior. The proposed m… Show more

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Cited by 473 publications
(318 citation statements)
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“…For example, community members can build a good reputation, milk it by cheating other members and then disappear and reappear under a new online identity and a clean record (Friedman and Resnick, 2001). They can use fake online identities to post dishonest feedback and thus try to inflate their reputation or tarnish that of their competitors (Dellarocas, 2000). Finally, the mediated nature of online feedback mechanisms raises questions related to the trustworthiness of their operators.…”
Section: Scale Enables New Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…For example, community members can build a good reputation, milk it by cheating other members and then disappear and reappear under a new online identity and a clean record (Friedman and Resnick, 2001). They can use fake online identities to post dishonest feedback and thus try to inflate their reputation or tarnish that of their competitors (Dellarocas, 2000). Finally, the mediated nature of online feedback mechanisms raises questions related to the trustworthiness of their operators.…”
Section: Scale Enables New Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The development of effective mechanisms for dealing with collusive efforts to manipulate online ratings is currently an active area of research. Dellarocas (2000;2001a) explores the use of robust statistics in aggregating individual ratings as a mechanism for reducing the effects of coordinated efforts to bias ratings. To this date, however, there is no effective solution that completely eliminates the problem.…”
Section: Eliciting Sufficient and Honest Feedbackmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Collusion occurs when two of more peers collectively boost one another's reputations or conspire against one or more peers in the network. Dellarocas identifies four types of collusion misbehavior [12]. In ballot stuffing form of collusion, a colluding group inflates each other's reputations which then allows them to use the good reputation to attack other system peers.…”
Section: Reputation Aggregationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The eBay rating system used for choosing trading partners where each participant in a transaction can vote (−1, 0, 1) on their counterpart, the Amazon customer review system and the Slashdot self-moderation of posts [1] are all systems where the ratings are provided by nodes but are stored in a central database. Many such reputation systems have been studied in the context of online communities and marketplaces [2,3,4].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%