Imaginative Vividness

Abstract

ABSTRACT:How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the ‘vivacity’ or ‘vividness’ of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use ‘vividness’ and cognate terms in discussions of imagination, it does not take much reflection to see that these terms are poorly understood. In this paper, I review both some relevant empirical literature as well as the philosophical literature in an attempt to get a handle on what it could mean, in an imaginative context, to talk of vividness. As I suggest, this notion ultimately proves to be so problematic as to be philosophically untenable.

Perceptual Representations and the Vividness of Stimulus-Triggered and Stimulus-Independent Experiences

“…In its original form, the VVIQ asks subjects to rate the vividness of their imagery on a 5-point scale (1 = perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision , 2 = clear and reasonably vivid , 3 = moderately clear and vivid , 4 = vague and dim , 5 = no image at all ). Although routinely used in experimental practice, the notion of vividness that the VVIQ tries to measure (i.e., VVIQ vividness) is notoriously problematic because it is only intuitively defined with the use of other concepts such as clarity, detail, brightness, intensity, and so on, which themselves are then left unexplained (see, e.g., Cornoldi et al, 1991; Denis, 1995; Kind, 2017; McKelvie, 1995a, 1995b). Even whether VVIQ vividness is supposed to be a single feature of experience or a construct with more than one component is debated (McKelvie, 1995a).…”

I Am Conscious, Therefore, I Am: Imagery, Affect, Action, and a General Theory of Behavior

“…Searching in familiar terrains of logic and theory of mind while ignoring less familiar terrains of neuroscience and psychology can produce a fragmentary review and false conclusions. These problems come to the fore in a recent paper on “imaginative vividness” by Kind [7], in which the author suggests that it would be “best to retire our reliance on this notion entirely”. These dismissive conclusions, I suggest, are based on incomplete examination of the evidence and faulty analysis of vividness and its phenomenology.…”

Introspection Is Signal Detection

“…More inaccurate judgments with lower confidence can be expected. It is a matter of contention what makes an image more or less vivid, or even what is meant by vividness (Kind [2017]). However, it is reasonable to assume that overall mental strength of a mental image is the result of an intensity aggregate across several dimensions: sensory properties (brightness, loudness, etc.…”