The protesters associated with the social movement that some call 'the second Arab Spring' (Ayoob 2019) gathered around the slogan ' All, meaning all!' (Kullkun yaʿnī kullkun), calling for the removal of all politicians, without exception, from governing positions. This chapter investigates whether the contempt for political elites felt by large segments of various populations scattered throughout the southern Mediterranean served as an inspiration for Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (hereafter Aziz), who, after coming to power in 2007 (officially elected in 2009), decided to launch a direct attack on the country's former ruling class.Aziz's answer to prominent Mauritanian politician Ould Khatri -a political leader from the eastern regions of the country who promptly offered his services in the aftermath of Aziz's coup d' état -may be revealing in this respect: 'I do not need you [i.e. authority figures and politicians] to run the country anymore. ' This statement put an end to the Mauritanian 'tradition' of governance by an unchanging political elite with a grip on the reins of power, in some cases since the country's independence in 1960. This radical attitude, hardly expected of a putschist seeking support, 1 may in truth have been a Machiavellian exploitation of the unpopularity of politicians, who were often seen as opportunistic and willing to acquiesce to any ruling power in order to maintain the privileges provided by this patronage system. Aziz surfed the populist wave that allowed him to dominate the political scene by virtually eliminating a de facto unpopular ruling class while assuming what can only be described, as we will see, as authoritarian rule over Mauritania 'dressed up' as a democracy.What explains the ascension to power of this ex-general, who has marked Mauritania's political landscape for the past fifteen years? 2 Can it be associated with 'strongman' forms of neopatrimonialism (see Bratton and Van de Walle 1994: 474-5, who classify Mauritania as a 'military oligarchy') or with the hybridization of power, as defined by Dufy and Thiriot (2013; see also Driscoll 2020)? Perhaps it is comparable to the pretorianism described by Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh and the 4