Illocution and accommodation in the functioning of presumptions

Witek, Maciej

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02459-4

Cited by 18 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…It is constantly updated during the course of the discourse by conversational moves performed by the interlocutors. This is possible due to the direct mechanism of illocution-e.g., that of assertion of question-or the indirect mechanism of accommodation (see Witek 2019b).…”

Section: Suppositions and Presuppositionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Standard and Non-standard Suppositions and Presuppositions

Kasjanowicz

2021

Axiomathes

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In this paper, I argue that the distinction between standard and non-standard pragmatic implications, originally used to differentiate among types of conversational implicatures, applies to the family of contents—traditionally referred to as ‘presuppositions’—that exhibit projective behaviour. Following the scholars working within the Question Under Discussion model of communication, I distinguish between two types of projective implications: suppositions and presuppositions narrowly construed. Next, I identify two rules of appropriateness that govern the use of, respectively, supposition-triggering and presupposition-triggering expressions. Finally, I argue that the ostentatious violation of the rules in question gives rise to non-standard projective implications, whereas their observance results in standard suppositions and presuppositions; I also use the idea of discourse coherence to develop a sketchy account of the mechanisms underlying the functioning of non-standard projective implications.

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Section: Suppositions and Presuppositionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Standard and Non-standard Suppositions and Presuppositions

Kasjanowicz

2021

Axiomathes

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“…There are many types of illocutionary force indicative devices, some of which are linguistic (e.g., performative prefixes, grammatical moods, illocutionary adverbs, and so on), whereas other are paralinguistic in Wharton's (2003;2012) sense. One example of the latter can be a natural code of 16 According to Marina Sbisà, speech acts are "context-changing social actions" (Sbisà 2002, 421) whose types are to be defined by reference to how their performance affects the context of their production; in particular, the force of an illocutionary act is to be defined by reference to how it affects the score of conversation by making certain subsequent conversational moves appropriate or out of order (for a discussion of this idea, see (Witek 2015c) and (Witek 2019c). According to Green (2007, 74), in turn, what determines the force of an act is the speaker's overt intention to show that she is committed to the propositional content she puts forth in a way defined by appropriate conversational norms.…”

Section: Organon Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our discourse-independent thoughts, by 20 Of course more conditions have to be met in order for accommodation to work. For a discussion of this topic, see (Witek 2019a) and (Witek 2019c). For a discussion of blocking the accommodation of faulty presuppositions, see (Langton 2018).…”

Section: Discourse-independent and Discourse-constituted Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, in forming and expressing the thought, the speaker internalizes and foregrounds the (i) conversational situation her speech act is designed to address and the (ii) conversation-bound perspective on herself that corresponds to her conversational role or authority (Jaszczolt and Witek 2018). The mental state thereby formed is a discourse-constituted 24The illocutionary point of the act of presuming, in turn, is to transfer the burden of proof from the speaker to the hearer; for a discussion of this topic, see (Walton 2010), (Corredor 2017), (Lewiński 2017), and (Witek 2019c).…”

Section: Table 1 Assertive Speech Acts and What They Expressmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Self-Expression in Speech Acts

Witek¹

2021

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My aim in this paper is to examine Mitchell S. Green's notion of self-expression and the role it plays in his model of illocutionary communication. The paper is organized into three parts. In Section 2, after discussing Green's notions of illocutionary speaker meaning and self-expression, I consider the contribution that selfexpression makes to the mechanisms of intentional communication; in particular, I introduce the notion of proto-illocutionary speaker meaning and argue that it is necessary to account for acts overtly showing general commitments that are not 'marked' as being specific to one or another illocutionary force. In Section 3, I focus on Green's account of expressive norms and argue that their function is to stabilize rather than constitute the structure of illocutionary signalling systems; moreover, I examine critically Green's idea according to which expressive norms enable us to indicate the force of our speech acts and suggest that they play a key role in the mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Finally, in Section 4, I elaborate on the idea of discourse-constituted thoughts-or, in other words, thoughts that exist in virtue of being expressed in making certain conversation-bound speech acts-and use it to develop a more comprehensive model of the expressive dimension of speech acts.

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“…An anonymous referee noted that some more general mechanism may play a role in the interpretation of the"Triglav example", i.e. the one which Langton (2018) andWitek (2019) would call a 'back-door speech' act that exploits the mechanism of accommodating presuppositions.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Taxonomy of Noncanonical Uses of Interrogatives

Puczyłowski

2021

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The aims of this paper are (i) to provide a detailed taxonomy of noncanonical uses of interrogative sentences, i.e. when they are used not to ask a question but to convey some information, or to ask a question albeit not that expressed by the interrogative sentence exploited in the act, (ii) to identify properties of circumstances where an interrogative sentence is being used in this way, and (iii) to propose some maxims that govern the rational use of questions. Four main categories of such cases are presented, and a few further subclasses are differentiated. I show how these types are interrelated, and what logical features differentiate them. I also propose a hypothesis for when an interrogative sentence is not being used in its primary mode. Studies on circumstances in which questions are used in other ways can shed light on maxims that govern asking and questioning in a rational conversation; therefore, some possible maxims of this kind are proposed.

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Illocution and accommodation in the functioning of presumptions

Cited by 18 publications

References 45 publications

Standard and Non-standard Suppositions and Presuppositions

Standard and Non-standard Suppositions and Presuppositions

Self-Expression in Speech Acts

A Taxonomy of Noncanonical Uses of Interrogatives

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