Illegal markets and the social costs of rent-seeking

Paul, Chris; Wilhite, Al

doi:10.1007/bf01047921

Cited by 24 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Naylor (1987Naylor ( , 1996 links the drug trade, black markets and corruption. Also see Paul and Wilhite (1994). Glynn, Kobrin and Naim (1997, p. 13) include even the problem of trust in private strategic alliances as related to corruption.…”

Section: Directions For Future Research and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption: A Review

Jain¹

2001

Journal of Economic Surveys

1,115

660

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Abstract. As is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations, corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development. The aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research. The paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption, and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models. This is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society, and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption. The paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research.

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Section: Directions For Future Research and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption: A Review

Jain¹

2001

Journal of Economic Surveys

1,115

660

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…If in the rich world, such illegal markets remain 'thin', in poorer countries these illegal markets are fairly 'thick'. Indeed, some economists see general crime as a type of externality of market altering rent seeking (Paul & Wilhite, 1994).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic governance and homicide: Some theory and empirics, 1990–2017

Soysa

2020

Journal of Peace Research

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This article posits that free-market institutions and practices reduce economic distortions that provide rents for underground organizations, which ultimately form criminogenic environments. Rents from market distortions provide ‘lootable income’ that feeds ‘criminal organizations’, which rely on violence for enforcement of contracts. Using an index of economic freedom, this study contrasts several relevant measures of political freedoms, political discrimination of individuals and groups, and measures of equal access to state ‘goods’ as proxies for political legitimacy and discrimination on the homicide rate. Fixed effects regression results suggest robustly that economic freedom, not political legitimacy, inclusive politics, or state capacity, reduces the homicide rate, results that are stubbornly significant and substantively large. The basic results are robust to a barrage of model specifications, different sample sizes, and estimation strategies, including instrumental variables analysis. The evidence suggests that unusually high homicide rates might be based in quotidian organizational activities related to ‘illegal’ markets rather than to political grievance-based explanations relating to relative deprivation and political legitimacy. Countries wishing to encourage growth-promoting policies need not fear higher levels of interpersonal violence based on various arguments linking free-market policies to societal disarray.

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“…As was the case more infamously for alcohol prohibition, Progressive reformers overestimated the power that government had to improve people's morality (as they saw it) and underestimated the unintended consequences of criminalising a profitable commercial sector. Prohibitions of any trade create opportunities for rent seeking for the privilege of supplying it (Paul and Wilhite, 1994). Absent formal legal recognition of the rights and property necessary to engage in trade, that competition will be settled with the threat and use of violence.…”

Section: Different Models Of Sex Work Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sex work and online platforms: what should regulation do?

Cowen

Colosi

2020

JEPP

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PurposeThe purpose is to assess the impact of online platforms on the sex industry, focusing specifically on direct sex work, and evaluate what approaches to platform regulation is likely to align with the interests of sex workers.Design/methodology/approachThe paper presents a review of interdisciplinary conceptual and empirical literature on sex work combined with analysis of key issues using a transaction cost framework.FindingsOnline platforms generally make sex work safer. Regulation aimed at preventing platforms from serving sex workers is likely to harm their welfare.Research limitations/implicationsRegulation of online platforms should take great care to differentiate coercive sex from consensual sex work, and allow sex workers to experiment with governance mechanisms provided by entrepreneurs.Originality/valueThe paper demonstrates how a transactions costs approach to market behaviour as applied to personal services like ridesharing can also shed light on the challenges that sex workers face, partly as a result of criminalisation, and the dangers of over-regulation.

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Illegal markets and the social costs of rent-seeking

Cited by 24 publications

References 22 publications

Corruption: A Review

Corruption: A Review

Economic governance and homicide: Some theory and empirics, 1990–2017

Sex work and online platforms: what should regulation do?

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