Illegal logging in Cameroon: Causes and the path forward

Alemagi, Dieudonne; Kozak, Robert

doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2010.07.008

Cited by 71 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 19 publications

(23 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The literature points to optimal land use models, income growth and demand for forest products, corruption, costly enforcement, illegal logging, and other institutional weaknesses. 8 Alemagi and Kozak (2010) argue that several or 6 The estimated numbers of such leakage vary between 5 and 95 percent, but more typical estimates are around 40 percent (Atmadja and Verchot, 2012;Jacobson, 2014;Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2009;Murray, 2008;Murray et al, 2004) . 7 In Nepal, "the Forest Department was poorly sta¤ed and thus unable to implement and enforce the national policies, and deforestation increased in the 1960s and 1970s" (Shyamsundar and Ghate, 2014, pp.85).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

Harstad

Mideksa

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes AbstractMotivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor's presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation can be legal or illegal in the model: each district decides how much to protect and how much to extract for sale on a common market. If districts are strong, in that they find protection inexpensive, extraction is sales-driven and districts bene.t if neighbors conserve. If districts are weak, they lose when neighbors conserve since the smaller supply increases the price and the pressure on the resource, and thus also the cost of protection. Consequently, decentralizing authority increases conservation if and only if districts are weak. Contracting with the central authority is socially optimal, but, on the one hand, the donor benefits from contracting with districts if they are weak; on the other hand, districts prefer to decentralize if they are strong. The presence of the donor may lead to a regime change that increases extraction by more than it is reduced by the contract itself.JEL-Code: Q340.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

Harstad

Mideksa

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…With oil, or 'black gold' being threatened as an economic asset Cameroon began to focus on the 'green gold' of the trees, and more focus was put on forestry. Cameroon's forests and forest products account for 10% of the country's GDP (Alemagi, and Kozak, 2010). Cameroon's Minister of forestry and wildlife reported in 2008 that 30% of Cameroon's total non-oil exports revenues come from the forestry sector.…”

Section: Explored In "Whymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It was estimated in 2002 that 5.3 million dollars worth of timber was illegally harvested from the country's forests. The 1994 Law is a device put in place to help curb illegal harvesting (Alemagi and Kozak, 2010).…”

Section: Explored In "Whymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both collusive and non-collusive forms of corruption can be found in Cameroon. This includes government official and private individuals depriving the government of its revenues, as well as the government demanding compensation for its services (Alemagi and Kozak, 2010).…”

Section: Imagementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Alemagi and Kozak (2010) found that the government's own involvement in corruption gives them little clout when trying to deal with other forms of corruption. With the high cost of applying for a community forest logging companies offer to pay for the certification, with an agreement that they can then harvest timber from the forest.…”

Section: Imagementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations