Ignorance of Language

Abstract

Is Chomsky right about the psychological reality of language? What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there “a language faculty”? The book gives controversial answers to such questions: that linguistics is about linguistic reality and not part of psychology; that linguistic rules are not represented in the mind; that speakers are largely ignorant of their language; that speakers’ intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the language faculty and are not the main evidence for grammars; that thought is prior to language in various ways; that linguistics should be concerned with what idiolects share, not with idiolects; that language processing is a fairly brute-causal associationist matter; that the rules of “Universal Grammar” are largely, if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty.

Are Linguists Better Subjects?

“…Conjoining the alternative instruction with the actual instruction (cf. Devitt [2006b], p. 109) might have blocked such cases, but without affecting judgments based on personal preference.…”

Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession

“…For instance, it has been found that successful ball fielders run 'at a speed that kept the acceleration of the tangent of the angle of elevation of gaze to the ball at 0' (McLeod and Dienes, [1996], p. 531); see also the discussion in Devitt ([2006a], p. 50). This is not, however, grounds for attributing TANGENT OF AN ANGLE to the players: its applications are quite circumscribed to the area of ball-catching, and being a competent fielder typically does not influence learning and performance in trigonometry or in any other applications that depart significantly from fielding.…”

Scientific modelling in generative grammar and the dynamic turn in syntax

“…The techniques and methodology which came along with the movement claimed to place the study of language at the level of an empirical, naturalistic science which would eventually be subsumed by biology or neurophysiology. Since this time, arguments have been proffered which challenged this claim on ontological grounds (Katz 1981;Carr 1990;Katz and Postal 1991), methodological grounds (Soames 1984;Hintikka 1999;Devitt 2006) and linguistic grounds from the various competing frameworks, some of which were spawned from the initial generative approach (Pustejovsky 1995;Prince andSmolensky 1993/2004;Kempson et al 2001;Jackendoff 2002).…”