Ignorance in context: The interaction of modified numerals and QUDs

Abstract

<p>We argue for a purely pragmatic account of the ignorance inferences associated with superlative but not comparative modifiers (at least vs. more than). Ignorance inferences for both modifiers are triggered when the question under discussion (QUD) requires an exact answer, but when these modifiers are used out of the blue the QUD is implicitly reconstructed based on the way these modifiers are typically used, and on the fact that "at least n", but not "more than n", mentions and does not exclude the lower bound "exactly n". The paper presents new experimental evidence for the context-sensitivity of ignorance inferences, and also for the hypothesis that the higher processing cost reported in the literature for superlative modifiers is context-dependent in the exact same way.</p><p>Keywords: superlative vs. comparative modifiers, ignorance inferences, questions under discussion, experimental semantics and pragmatics</p>

At least ignorance inferences come at a processing cost: Support from eye movements

“…As is evident from (8a-b), the question under discussion in our experimental items is a precise one (cf. I can tell you how much / I'm not sure how much exactly) and according to Westera & Brasoveanu's (2014) predictions and findings no difference between the two types of numeral modifiers is expected in the ignorance-triggering condition (-knowledgeable speaker contexts). On the other hand, according to a well-established claim in the modified numeral literature, ignorance should (more strongly) arise with superlative modifiers and a processing difference should be observed between the two types of numeral modifiers in the ignorance-triggering condition.…”

“…Strikingly, however, McNabb & Penka (2015) found no differences between the two contexts. In a different setup, Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) do find a difference between two kinds of contexts. In their study, consisting of two experiments that each combined an offline and an online task, they varied the question under discussion between a precise one (e.g., a how many question) and an imprecise one.…”

Pragmatic effects of `more than' and `at least' in incremental interpretation

“…This contrast between comparative and superlative numeral modifiers is also manifested in various offline experiments probing speaker ignorance effects using stimuli comparable to (1), but different methodologies (Geurts & Nouwen 2007;Geurts, Katsos, Cummins, Moons & Noordman 2010;Coppock & Brochhagen 2013a). Although there were already hints implicit in a few earlier theoretical studies (e.g., Fox & Hackl 2006;Mayr 2013), only recently studies have explicitly argued that comparative modifiers, too, can give rise to speaker ignorance, once we shift our attention away from a paradigm similar to that in (1) and consider what an utterance with a numeral modifier can be an answer to (Mayr & Meyer 2014;Westera & Brasoveanu 2014;Ciardelli, Coppock & Roelofsen 2017). More specifically, these studies observe that when an utterance with a comparative modifier is used as an answer to a how many question, see 2, it signals speaker ignorance.…”

“…Interestingly, there is no complete consensus among the aforementioned authors as to the status and strength of speaker ignorance implications of comparative modifiers. Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) argue that B's utterance in (2) gives rise to speaker ignorance to the same extent as its superlative counterpart, while Ciardelli et al (2017) claim that superlative modifiers trigger more robust speaker ignorance implications than comparative modifiers. Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) ran two experiments, each combining a validity judgement task that targets ignorance interpretations and a self-paced reading task in order to look into the incremental interpretation of utterances with comparative and superlative modifiers.…”

Reasoning with Partial Orders: Restrictions on Ignorance Inferences of Superlative Modifiers

“…These type of Ignorance Inferences are pervasive, as they appear with a variety of complements-as long as SMs are used by a cooperative speaker within a discourse that meets certain pragmatic conditions (Westera & Brasoveanu 2014). The division of labor between semantics and pragmatics in deriving the various implications conveyed by sentences like (1) is debated.…”