If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics

Abstract

In their daily practices, many ethical vegans choose what to eat, wear, and buy among a range that is limited to the exclusion of animal products. Rather than considering and then rejecting the idea of using such products, doing so often does not occur to them as a possibility at all. In other cases, when confronted with the possibility of consuming animal products, vegans have claimed to reject it by saying that it would be impossible for them to do so. I refer to this phenomenon as ‘moral impossibility’. An analysis of moral impossibility in animal ethics shows that it arises when one’s conception of ‘what animals are’ shifts—say through encounter with other animals. It also arises when individuals learn more about animals and what happens to them in production facilities. This establishes a link between increased knowledge, understanding, and imaginative exploration on the one hand, and the exclusion of the possibility of using animals as resources on the other. Taking moral impossibility in veganism seriously has two important consequences: one is that the debate around veganism needs to shift from choice and decision, to a prior analysis of concepts and moral framing; the other is that moral psychology is no longer seen as empirical psychology plus ethical analysis, but the contents of psychological findings are understood as being influenced and framed by moral reflection.

Las dos caras del veganismo: beneficios y riesgos en la salud de una dieta vegana

“…Las razones éticas se asocian a consideraciones de carácter filosófico, moral y emocional para con el bienestar animal (Costa et al, 2019;Panizza, 2020;Mathieu y Dorard, 2016;Ruby et al, 2016). Por ello, quienes se inician en una dieta vegana por estos argumentos suelen estar en favor del antiespecismo y, de igual manera, tienden a promover los derechos de los animales (Chuck et al, 2016;Mathieu y Dorard, 2016).…”