Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption 2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_8
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If Politics is the Problem, How Can External Actors be Part of the Solution?

Abstract: The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Ba… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…These arrangements can mean that donors find themselves in the position of the 'principal' to the 'agent' of the aid-receiving government or other implementing agencies (Barder, 2009a;Martens et al, 2002;Ostrom, 2002). This is in contrast to focusing on the (collective) principal-agent relationships between citizens and politicians (Devarajan and Khemani, 2016;Ferejohn, 1986;Page and Pande, 2018;World Bank, 2016. This struggle between competing principals is linked to the dual accountability -or dual responsivenessframework shown earlier.…”
Section: Donor Constraintsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…These arrangements can mean that donors find themselves in the position of the 'principal' to the 'agent' of the aid-receiving government or other implementing agencies (Barder, 2009a;Martens et al, 2002;Ostrom, 2002). This is in contrast to focusing on the (collective) principal-agent relationships between citizens and politicians (Devarajan and Khemani, 2016;Ferejohn, 1986;Page and Pande, 2018;World Bank, 2016. This struggle between competing principals is linked to the dual accountability -or dual responsivenessframework shown earlier.…”
Section: Donor Constraintsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It appears to be very difficult to induce 'political will', which is often seen as a black box (Hudson et al, 2018). For example, policy conditionality has been extensively criticised for poor results, skewed incentives and isomorphic mimicry (Babb and Carruthers, 2008;Collier et al, 1997;Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018;Devarajan and Khemani, 2016;DFID, 2013;Kentikelenis et al, 2016;Pritchett et al, 2010). It has also been noted for its limited success in changing policy (Killick, 1997), due to factors such as backsliding and reversals, and weak impact due to donor credibility problems (Svensson, 2003).…”
Section: Benefits Of Agency For Local Leadersmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…According to the World Bank, the key to achieving good governance is first to obtain 'good governments', which are led by effective political leaders. Thus, civil society and the development sector should concentrate their efforts on enabling environments that promote the selection of good political leadership at all administrative levels, by providing the public with specific, reliable and impartial information on the performance of leaders (Devarajan and Khemani 2016). This 'technical' fix is clearly not enough, however, given that politics is, by definition, political.…”
Section: Spaces For Civil Societymentioning
confidence: 99%